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Chapter 1 
1. General introduction and overview of the study  
1.1. Background to the study 
Despite the fact that in the aftermath of the two World Wars human rights became the pillar of 
foreign policies of United Nations (UN) member states; ‘realpolitik’1 also prevailed in order to 
achieve national interests.2 However, South Africa is not an exception in this regard. In the 
events leading to its liberation, the African National Congress (ANC) as the then government in 
waiting of South Africa pledged that its international relations will be guided by human rights in 
all instances whether it is social, political, economical or environmental.3 This led to the 
aftermath of the 1994 democratic elections Government enacting the South African 
Constitution Act 108 of 1996 which in Chapter Two embodies the Bill of Rights that emphasizes 
the significance of human rights domestically and internationally. To this end, the 1996 
Constitution encompasses the recognition of international human rights law.4 
This as a backdrop led to the realisation of the philosophy of ‘ubuntu’5 as a South African 
foreign policy diplomacy since 2011. In doing so, the government acknowledges the nature and 
challenges of the South African society and how it can use the perception of ‘humanity’ central 
to ubuntu values to resolve or participate in the mediation of the regional or continental, as 
                                                          
1 Realipolitik refers to ‘politics based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical 
or ethical objectives ’ [Merriam-Webster available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/realpolitik  (accessed on 14 December 2015)]  
2 Bohle-Muller N ‘Nuanced Balancing Act: South Africa’s National and International Interests and its 
‘African Agenda’ (2012) 120 South African Institute of International Affairs 5. [Hereafter referred to as 
Bohle-Muller]  
3 Mandela N ‘South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy’ 81 International Affairs 87. [Hereafter referred to as 
Mandela] 
4 Bohle-Muller supra note 1, at 5.  
5 Ubuntu as reflected on the front page of White Paper on SA’s Foreign Policy of 13 May 2011 refers to 
‘humanity’. In addition to that, the ubuntuideology is described as South African foreign policy diplomacy.  
However, rather than being know as foreign policy diplomacy, there are significant connotations attached 
to the concept of ubuntu. For instance, its meaning is shared across Nguni official languages in South 
Africa with the motto in isiZulu ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ which directly translate in English (a human 
is a human through other human beings) as cited in Elechi OO, Morris SVC &Schafer EJ ‘Restoring 
Justice (Ubuntu): An African Perspective’ (2010) 20 International Criminal Justice Review 75. 
Furthermore, according to Mokgoro, the concept of ubuntuentails social values in South Africa or Africans 
such as group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanistic orientation and 
collective unity (Mokgoro JY ‘Ubuntu and the Law of South Africa (1998) Conrad-Adenauer-Sifting 
Seminar Report of the Colloquium 3). 
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well as international issues.6 For instance, domestically, the democratic South Africa is faced 
with developmental challenges in part emanating from its apartheid regime such as poverty, 
inequality, underdevelopment, and unemployment among youth, endemic diseases like 
HIV/AIDS and poor healthcare system and lack of basic quality education.7 Therefore, these 
challenges as will be shown in the subsequent sections, have an impact on South Africa’s voting 
in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC or the Council).  
In this regard, on the basis of its foreign policy, South Africa has emerged as a significant role 
player both on the African continent as well as international stage.8 For instance, South Africa 
participates in a number of peacekeeping missions.9 It also takes credit for the creation of the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), because it plays a significant role at the 
African Union (AU) and UN levels, and continues to contribute significantly as a negotiator in a 
number of conflicts.10 All of these efforts are aimed towards the promotion and protection of 
human rights. 
However, in recent years, questions have been raised on how the government of South Africa 
conducts itself in relation to some events. Some examples of this can be cited here such as the 
situations in Libya conflict, and issues of rule of law, human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe 
and Myanmar11 have been highlighted as examples where South Africa’s actions were not in 
                                                          
6 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy (13 May 2011) 4. 
7 A/HRC/21/16 “Report of the Working Group on the UPR South Africa, (09 July 2012), at paras 14-21. 
8 Masters L “Opening the ‘black box’: South African foreign policy-making”, Chapter 2, in Landsberg C & 
Van Wyk (Eds) South African Foreign Policy Review, (2012) 21-26.   
9 Matheba G ‘The Role of South Africa in the Security Structures of Southern Africa’ (2003) Department of 
International Relations and Trade Office of the South African State President 16-17 and; Masters L 
“Opening the ‘black box’: South African foreign policy making”, Chapter 2,  in Landsberg C & Van Wyk 
(eds) South African Foreign Policy Review, (2012) 22.  
10 Nathan L ‘African Solutions to African Problems: South African Foreign Policy’ (2013) 51 South African 
Foreign Policy Initiative 1.  
11 Firstly, in the case of Myanmaron12 January 2007 when a draft resolution was proposed by United 
States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) calling on the junta to cease military attacks, put an end to human 
rights and humanitarian law violations and government to begin a substantive political dialogue 
immediately to pave the way for genuine democratic transition as well as unconditionally release Aung 
San SuuKyi. However, despite those attempts the resolution was not passed because permanent 
members in the UNSC such as Russia and China voted against the resolution. Surprisingly and with a 
wide criticism, the South African Government despite its human rights and democratic values South Africa 
inherited in the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy voted against the resolutions siding with 
countries known for their dubious human rights record (Tladi D ‘Strict positivism, moral arguments, human 
rights and the Security Council: South Africa and the Myanmar vote’ (2008) African Human Rights Law 
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line with its human rights obligations.12 As a UN member South Africa is obliged to preserve 
international peace and security and promote and protect human rights as reflected in the UN 
Charter of 1945. Therefore, despite the fact that it is inevitable of UN member states to act in 
favour of their national interests they are not allowed to violate the international human rights 
law. 
Furthermore, Government of South Africa’s denial of the entrance visa to allow Dalai Lama to 
enter and take part in activities in the country has also been highlighted as an inconsistency in 
its foreign policy.13 And more recently, questions have been raised as to the extent of 
commitment by the Government of South Africa to human rights in connection with its non-
compliance to effect the arrest of President Al Bashir on the basis of the arrest warrant issued 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC).14 
As a result of these and other similar issues have been raised regarding whether the South 
African Government foreign policy is still indeed informed by its international human rights 
obligations. In general, it is also of greater significance to investigate whether South Africa’s 
actions sometimes contradict its signing and ratification of international human rights and 
humanitarian law instruments as informed by Section 231(2) of the South African Constitution. 
Among others, are the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1949 as well 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Journal26). Secondly, on the Zimbabwe case study,the South African Government in solidarity with its 
regional neighboursthough at the expense of human rights and democracywasreluctant to criticise 
authoritarian President Robert Mugabe although there was substantial evidence confirming prevalence of 
election rigging and state-sponsored violence within the country. Instead the South African urged the west 
to cease their economic sanctions as Zimbabwe is a prime location for Southern African investment. 
Consequently, itastonishingly ridiculed andvoted against the UN resolution to implement sanctions in 
Zimbabwe. And thirdly, on the Libyan case study, South Africa despite initially voting in favour of the 
UNSC resolution 1973 of “no-fly zone” to stop the Libyan forces from killing innocent people following the 
2011 Arab Spring, it was dissatisfied with how the resolution was executed by North Atlantic Organisation 
Treaty (NATO) forces to the extent of enforcing regime change in solidarity with the AU regional 
counterparts demanding African solution to the Libyan matter. (Keally K ‘South African Foreign Policy: 
Implications for Democracy’ (09 November 2012), Council for a Community of Democracies, available 
athttp://www.ccd21.org/news/africa/south_africa_foreign_policy.html (accessed 23 April 2015). 
12 Keally K ‘South African Foreign Policy: Implications for Democracy’ (09 November 2012), Council for a 
Community of Democracies, available 
athttp://www.ccd21.org/news/africa/south_africa_foreign_policy.html (accessed 23 April 2015).  
13 Ibid. 
14  Cohen M ‘Al-Bashir sets up high court and Zuma administration clash’ (23 June 2015) Mail and 
Guardian Online, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-23-al-bashir-cause-of-clash-between-south-
african-courts-and-state (accessed on 24 June 2015).  
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as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) of 1966 and their Optional Protocols under the International Bill of Rights to promote 
international peace and security as well as international human rights promotion and 
protection.15 
This as a backdrop informs the purpose of this paper that endeavours to look specifically at the 
voting records and patterns of the Government of South Africa as a member of the UNHRC. 
Thus, this paper will assess such a record with the mandate of determining if the South African 
Government foreign policy actions are in compliance with its international human rights 
obligations in the UN Charter and the mentioned instruments that South Africa signed and 
ratified in order for the international community to take actions against it. 
1.2.  Statement of the Problem  
Despite the fact that South Africa in terms of its Constitution and foreign policy believes in 
making human rights central to its activities, on many occasions in the UNHRC, it has been 
found voting opposite to these values. In this regard, it has been found aligning itself with the 
countries known for poor human rights records. Subsequently, this raises the question of 
whether the current foreign policy of South Africa is still driven by the high regard for human 
rights. As a result, this paper endeavours to look specifically at the voting records and patterns 
of the Government of South Africa as a member of the UN Human Rights Council (2008-2010 
and 2013-2015). It will assess such a record with a view to determine whether the 
Government’s foreign policy is in compliance with its international human rights obligations. 
1.3.  Scope of the study  
The proposed study will focus on South Africa’s voting record in the UNHRC. In doing so, the 
study is time bound from 2008-2010 and 2013-2015 because these periods mark the tie that 
South Africa served as a member of the Human rights Council. The assessment will not focus on 
                                                          
15 Isa FG & de Feyter K (Eds.) International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges 
(2006) 140. 
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all voting done at the Human Rights Council during this period but rather interrogate and 
highlight those that relate to resolutions on the human rights situations of specific countries or 
thematic areas. 
1.4. Research question(s) 
This study aims to respond to the following questions: 
 What is the voting record of South Africa in relation to UNHRC resolutions?  
 Does the country’s voting record comply with its international and regional 
human rights obligations? 
 Does South Africa’s voting pattern on resolutions of UNHRC comply with its 
foreign policy objectives or principles on democracy and human rights?   
1.5. Research Methodology and limitation(s) 
The study is based on a desk review of series of literature including both primary and secondary 
sources relevant to the subject of discussion. Such sources as international instruments, 
treaties and conventions, legislation reports, leading textbooks on the South African foreign 
policy and international human rights law, journal articles, comments and cases, as well as 
Department of International Relations Cooperation (DIRCO) or government speeches pertaining 
to South Africa’s international relations policies and actions have been used throughout the 
study.  
However, despite that in this study interviews or fieldwork have not been conducted as a way 
of gathering data. 
1.6.  Literature review 
The selectivity and politicization of international human rights by the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) led to its replacement by the UNHRC on March 2006 by 
resolution 60/251 of the General Assembly (GA).16 However, despite positive hopes following 
the Commission’s replacement by the Council, according to commentators, it seems to be a 
                                                          
16 Mallory C ‘Membership and the UN Human Rights Council’ (2013) 2 Canadian Journal of Human 
Rights 3. 
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representation of old wine in new bottles because it continues to fall to the same traps of 
politicization and selectivity.17 
Following the report of the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan detailing the failures of the 
UNCHR because of the election of countries with poor human rights record such as China,18 
Libya, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Togo, the credibility of the Commission was 
undermined further.19 This is because these countries entered the Commission not to enhance 
human rights promotion and protection but rather to “point fingers” at others’ deteriorating 
human rights abuses and argue the case for their sovereignty when it came to reported cases of 
human rights violations.20 Yet, the actions of these countries blur the good work of other 
countries that value human rights because sometimes the interests that are protected by these 
countries have little influence on the protection and promotion of human rights that is 
envisaged in the world post world wars.21 
According to Hug and Luk´acs22 the tension is often on existing differences between North and 
South on which rights should come first- either those in the ICCPR or those on the ICESCR. 
Therefore, despite the fact that there was hope in the reform of the Commission to the Council 
in 2006, regional memberships or groupings in the Council still dictate the agenda that is 
sometimes not progressive or conducive for the  promotion and protection of human rights.23 
As a result, individual member states including South Africa are sometimes seen as failing to 
meet their obligations in the international human rights treaty bodies.24 This is because as the 
                                                          
17 Hug S &Luk´acs R ‘Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2014) 9 
Rev IntOrgan 84. [Hereafter referred to as Hug and Luk´acs] 
18 It remained in the UNCHR since 1982 until early 2000s as identified by Edwards MS, Scott KM, Allen 
SH & Irvin K ‘Sins of commission? Understanding membership patterns on the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission’ (2008)61Political Research Quarterly 5 
19 Cox E ‘State Interests and the Creation and Functioning of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ 
(2010) 6 Journal of International Law and International Relations 100. [hereafter referred to as Cox] 
20 Edwards MS, Scott KM, Allen SH &Irvin K ‘Sins of commission? Understanding membership patterns 
on the United Nations Human Rights Commission’ (2008)61Political Research Quarterly 5.  
21 Edwards et al supra note 18, at 5. [hereafter referred to as Edwards et al]  
22 Hug and Luk´acs supra note 15, at 86.  
23 Cox supra note 17, at 106.  
24 Muntingh L ‘SA’s failures in the international human-rights system’, Mail and Guardian Thought Leader, 
(27 October 2014), available at, http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/lukasmuntingh/2014/10/27/sas-failures-
in-the-international-human-rights-system/ (accessed on 5 July 2015). 
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new body in the UN system, the UNHRC requires member states to adhere to obligations such 
as going through the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process.25 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of UNCHR reform to UNHRC, studies on voting patterns in the 
international community focused on the notion of “blocs”.26 The idea of “blocs” plays an 
important role in the GA in order to determine the direction and suggest ideas about voluntary 
and involuntary cooperation and coordination among countries on specific topics.27 However, 
although in the early writings during the Cold War era the focus was on the ideological voting 
patterns in the international community between Western states led by the United States of 
America (US) and Soviet Union led by Russia and China;28 now this has changed to the voting 
behaviours among democracies and non-democracies.29 
In particular, the change has been noticed post the Cold War era especially by influence of the 
existence of European Union (EU) in the international scene spearheading the significance of 
human rights since it is one of the thresholds for its membership.30 This is because since the 
late 1950s until early 1990s when South Africa received its liberation from minority rule, African 
countries that were still under colonial rule at the time when the UN was formed, were 
mobilising for their recognition in the international affairs as independent countries with 
sovereignty equality right similar to major powers.31 Therefore, when ideological differences 
came to an end among blocs, the issue of the voting in terms of the political systems of 
democracies and non-democracies came into effect leading to the reform of the UNCHR to 
                                                          
25  ‘United Nations Human Rights Council’, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (accessed on 20 June 2015).  
26 Hug and Luk´acs supra notes 15, at 87.  
27 Hug and Luk´acs supra notes 15, at 88.   
28 Holloway S ‘Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting’ (1990) 23 Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 283. 
29 Young H and Rees N ‘EU Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly, 1990-2002: The EU's 
Europeanising Tendencies (2005) 16 Irish Studies in International Affairs 193.  
30 Wouters J, Basu S &Bernaz N ‘The role of the European Union in the human rights council’ (2008) 
Technical Report EIUC - European Inter University Centre, Venice 6. [hereafter referred to as Woutersat 
al]  
31 Abebe AM ‘Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council’ (2009) Human Rights Law Review 2. [Hereafter referred to as Abebe] 
 18 | P a g e  
 
UNHRC in 2006 following the proposal by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs prepared by 
Professor Kälin and Cecilia Jimenez.32 
According to Piccone33 whether a member state votes at the UNHRC in favour of country 
scrutiny or non-intervention is an important indicator of how “human rights friendly its foreign 
policy is”. This is because the newly elected democrats such as India, Indonesia and South Africa 
under the blocs of Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
and African Group on Israel’s Occupied Territories seem to always to vote in favour of country-
specific scrutiny despite the fact that on Myanmar, Sudan and several others they either 
abstain or vote against UNHRC resolutions.34 At the centre of the arguments of the countries 
including South Africa in the mentioned blocs or groups is a rejection of “defamation of 
religion” or as well known the religious intolerance, which became predominant in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 event that shocked the international community and consequently led to 
the US to sometimes illegally fight against the war on terror.35 
In this regard, the focus of this paper has not yet been a subject of discussion in any academic 
literature; hence, the aim of this paper is to close that vacuum. This is because South Africa’s 
voting patterns on resolutions requiring country-specific scrutiny especially when it comes to 
DRC, Sri Lanka and Iran in addition to the others mentioned raises many questions that relates 
to its constitutional and foreign policy values of ubuntu. Instead the South African Government 
is being noticed siding with countries that have poor human rights records in the international 
system.36 Therefore, as reiterated the extent to which South Africa adhered to its founding 
values and obligations will be measured based on how it had been voting in the UNHRC 
especially when it comes to resolutions pertaining to particular countries. 
 
                                                          
32 Wouterset al supra note 28, at 6.  
33 Piccone T ‘Do New Democracies Support Democracy?The multilateral dimension (2011) 22 Journal of 
Democracy 144.  [Hereafter referred to as Piccone] 
34 Piccone supra note 31, at 141.  
35 Scharffs BG ‘International Law and the Defamation of Religion Conundrum (2013) 11(1) The Review of 
Faith & International Affairs 66.  
36 Jordaan E ‘South Africa and Abusive Regimes at the UN Human Rights Council’ (2014) 20 Global 
Governance 233. [Hereafter referred to as Jordaan] 
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1.7. Chapter Overview  
This paper is made up of four chapters. 
Chapter One will introduce the work, and hence will address issues pertaining to the 
background to the study, objectives, questions, literature review and research methods as well 
as chapter outline as indicated above.  
Furthermore, chapter two will examine the challenges South African Government encountered 
in its international relations. In doing so, the aim is to discover which international human rights 
documents that the South African Government have signed and ratified so that South Africa 
could easily be held accountable by the international community. This is also because the 
ratification of international treaty on human rights by the South African Government for 
instance indicates that it is committed to abide by international standards government human 
rights. Therefore, determining to what extent the South African Government achieved its 
international human rights duties and what it will do further for progressive realisation of 
human rights in the country and at the international level in particular as the UNHRC member 
state in the periods 2008-2010 and 2013-2015 is of great significance.  
Chapter three will assess South Africa’s voting patterns for the terms of 2008-2010 and 2013-
2015. In doing so, the aim is to determine whether the voting patterns of the South African 
Government confirm its signing and ratification of international human rights instruments and 
commitments as entailed in its campaign documents to the UNHRC. In addition to that, 
whether the voting patterns of the South African Government are in line with its constitutional 
and foreign policy values in the UNHRC will be assessed in order to determine what informs a 
particular way of voting on each UN member state in the Council.  
Chapter four will link together conclusions that have been reached in the previous three 
chapters and more importantly chapters two and three. In doing so, this chapter will bind 
together the responsibilities of the South African Government as embodied in Chapter Two of 
this paper taking into consideration South Africa’s signing and ratification of international 
documents. It will furthermore, assess whether the South African Government in the UNHRC 
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voted according to the responsibilities embodied in Chapter Two in the periods 2008 to 2010 
and 2013 to 2015. Therefore, at the heart of this, is to explore whether the South African 
Government failed or succeeded to meet its international human rights obligations in the 
UNHRC and if South Africa failed to abide by the international community rules actions needs to 
be taken against it.  
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Chapter 2 
2. Human rights challenges in South Africa’s international relations 
2.1. Introduction 
Despite the fact that South Africa signed and ratified international human rights documents as 
indicated in chapter one, it remains questionable whether its voting patterns in the UNHRC are 
aligned with the responsibilities that are attached to the signing and ratification of international 
documents in the global stage post the World War II era. The same applies to its Constitutional 
and foreign policy values that require the democratic South African Government to fulfil its 
human rights obligations post 1994 domestically and internationally. Hence, the purpose of this 
chapter is to assess the challenges that South Africa encountered in its international relations in 
the UNHRC and related treaty bodies later in the chapter with knowledge of its international 
human rights treaties and in its 2011 foreign policy document guided by the diplomacy of 
ubuntu.  
Since the UNHRC is a formal body in the UN based on principles of professionalism, countries 
during their campaign to serve in the UNHRC countries are required to submit pledging 
documents on human rights achievements and prospects for the future.37 Considering that, in 
this chapter whether South Africa encounter challenges in fulfilling its global human rights 
obligations international relations will be demarcate according to three subsections. In Part one 
it will explore the UNHRC membership and the challenges that the body itself had encountered 
previously. Further, in Part two it will discuss what is entailed in the pledging documents in 
juxtaposition with the obligations of the South African Government to the UNHRC.  
 
In so doing, it will take into consideration the objectives of the South African foreign policy on 
human rights as well as what the Constitution of South Africa propose when it comes to 
international human rights issues.38 Then, Part three will outline the examples of challenges 
                                                          
37 A/HRC/RES/5/1, 18 June 2007, para. 1.   
38 Section 39 of the South African Constitution of 1996 on interpretation of Bill of Rights. 
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that the South African Government encountered with regards to international human rights 
issues generally followed by the concluding remarks of the author.  
2.2. UNHRC membership and its challenges 
As highlighted in the literature review section of chapter one the UNHRC directly reports to the 
GA rather than the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as that was the case in the previous 
body.39 In the UN sub-bodies, the Council is made up of 47 member states from regional 
political or economic communities such as Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean as 
well as Western Europe and other States and Eastern Europe of the UN.40 These countries, 
therefore collectively constitute the UNHRC membership which acts as an inter-governmental 
body mandated to monitor the promotion and the protection of human rights in the world.41 
Moreover, there are tools that the UNHRC uses to fulfil its mandate. These include among 
others the UPR which was approved by the GA resolution in terms of Article 64 of the UN 
Charter.42 It requires the review of human rights situations in states in a manner that is 
universal, objective and non-discriminatory.43 In doing so, the UPR is accompanied by special 
procedures, advisory committee and complaint procedure as approved by the UNHRC 
                                                          
39 Smith R ‘A review of African States in the first cycle of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 
Universal Periodic Review’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 348.  
40 ‘The UNHRC Member States are distributed as follows: 13 from the African Group and another 13 from 
the Asia-Pacific States, 8 in Latin America and Caribbean, 7 in Western Europe and other States as well 
as 6 from Eastern European States as reflected in the United Nations Office of Higher Commission on 
Human Rights Website. For instance see ‘Membership of the Human Rights Council’, available at, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Membership.aspx (accessed on 20 July 2015). Also see 
‘United Nations Human Rights Council’, available at, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (accessed on 20 July 2015). 
41  ‘United Nations Human Rights Council’, available at, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (accessed on 20 July 2015).  
42 Article 64(1) and (2) of the UN Charter which requires the GA to take appropriate steps to obtain 
regular reports from the specialized agencies or make arrangements with the Members States and with 
the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations 
and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the GA. It also may 
communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.  
43 See A/RES/60/251, 3 April 2006, para 5 (e); Davala M ‘Universal Periodic Review: Effective monitoring 
of human rights standards?’ (2009) Days of Law: The Conference Proceedings in Masaryk University. In 
this regard, according to the current serving Secretary-General of UN Ban Ki-moon “the UPR is defined 
as having a greater potential to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world” as 
indicated in the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
‘Universal Periodic Review’, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx 
(accessed on 26 July 2015).  
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Resolution 5/1.44 These techniques were drafted in order to avoid the repetition of mistakes of 
the UNCHR and to enhance the work of the UNHRC in advancing human rights promotion and 
protection using independent bodies such as experts in the field of human rights law and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) which previously had little room to intervene or participate 
on international human rights matters.45 
Despite those theoretical achievements, the UPR of the UNHRC in practice encountered many 
challenges in the execution of its human rights mandate or obligations. 
2.2.1. Challenges encountered by the UPR of the UNHRC 
Although the UNHRC has plausible theoretical framework since it was envisaged as to be more 
far-reaching than the Commission, there are several failures that it consistently encounters 
similar to those of the UNCHR on the ground.46 These challenges are specific to the UPR tool as 
embodied in Article 64 of the UN Charter that requires the Council as per Resolution 60/251 of 
the GA to institutionalise human rights periodic reporting by member states on achievements 
and commitments.47 At this particular juncture, they relate in particular to the process of the 
resolutions and translation into practices, recommendations made to the states under review 
(SuR) as well as implementation and follow up procedures.48 
For instance, countries such as Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Gambia and China as SuR deliberately 
rejected or politicized some of the UNHRC modal practicalities regarding the UPR process.49 
                                                          
44 Nada L ‘The role of NGOs in the UN Human Rights Council’ (2007) 7 SUR-International Journal on 
Human Rights 9. [hereafter referred to as Nada] 
45 Nada supra notes 41, at 9. 
46 See the Secretary-General Address to the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, (07 April 2005) 
available at http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=1388 (accessed on 20 July 2015). Also 
see GA/RES/60/251, 03 April 2006, para. 5(e). 
47 Hickey E "The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights 
Situation on the Ground?" ILC Journal 3. [Hereafter referred to as Hickey]. 
48 Hickeys supra note 44, at3-8.  
49 In this regard, see the Troika as a Council’s three member states rapporteurs prepare the review 
process and transmit questions to the SuR in advance of the interactive dialogue. However, despite part 
of the Troika Pakistan on 28 February 2008 declined to serve on the review of India. Furthermore, the 
Outcome Report is adopted by the plenary of the Council either via resolution or decision reached on 
consensus basis in order to underline the cooperative nature of the mechanism. Therefore, in the first 
cycle of the UPR in 2011 the considerable negotiations occurred before the report of Israel was adopted 
(ISHR, 2009, Overview of 10th Session p.12). Also see HRC Resolutions 12/25 Outcome on China, March 
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These according to Resolution 5/1 of June 2007 include a report prepared by the state 
containing self assessment of human rights situation; a compilation of information from the 
Offices of the Higher Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) as well as additional, reliable 
and credible information provided by other relevant stakeholders such as National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and NGOs reports that are summarised by the OHCHR to constitute 
ten pages of length.50 In this regard, these member states used their sovereign equality right to 
defend themselves from complying with the UN human rights standards as embodied in the 
UPR process in favour their national interests at the expense of human rights. 
Therefore, as stated in chapter one, among the reasons for the rejection of modal practicalities 
of the UPR by the mentioned member states relates specifically to controversial loyalty to their 
sovereignty equality right as embodied in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter that sometimes lead to 
the disrespect of democracy and compromise of human rights.51 This blind loyalty to the 
principle of non-interference is sometimes particularly associated with religious or cultural and 
racial or ethnic aspects of human rights as argued by mentioned countries during their UPR 
process.52 However, as a result of sovereign integrity veneration principle, the South African 
Government encountered a challenge of balancing its human rights obligations with its national 
interests internationally.  
For instance, despite beyond the scope of this paper the South African Government during its 
first tenure in the UNSC in 2008 following the human rights outbreak in Zimbabwe after the 
2008 elections result rejection by the ruling party in that country, used the ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
approach to preserve or respect the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and African unity, although little 
regard for democracy and human rights was paid as embodied in its Constitution and foreign 
policy documents.53 Despite that, below there are other examples where the South African 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2009, para. 27; 14/12, Outcome on Iran, 15 March 2010, para.92 and 14/61, Outcome on Gambia, 24 
March 2010, para.62. 
50 A/HRC/RES/5/1, 18 June 2007, para. 15.  
51 Hickey supra note 44, at 5.  
52 See A/HRC/14/12 Outcome Report on Iran, 15 March 2015, para. 92 and A/HRC/14/61 Outcome on 
Gambia, 24 March 2010, para.62 and several others on China, Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea 
etc. 
53 See Smith K ‘Soft power: The essence of South Africa’s foreign policy’, Chapter 4 in Landsberg C & 
Van Wyk (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review, (2012) 77. Also see Qobo M & Dube M ‘South 
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Government failed to balance its national interests and international human rights obligations 
will be provided.  
In doing so, according to commentators the South African Government fell to the same traps of 
unbridled loyalty to both regional unity and geopolitics of the Commission now in the Council.54 
Despite that, these actions sometimes keep on undermining the very essence of progressive 
activities that the UNHRC could offer in the field of human rights at the international level now 
contributing to the expansion of the Commission tactics in the Council. 
However, when these factors are combined together consistently undermine the positive role 
that could be played by UNHRC in the attainment of national interest in the global stage. This is 
because when there are no violations of human rights, economic relations are being facilitated 
between countries without fears of losing one country interests in particular member states of 
UN that are known for dubious human rights record. Possibly, this approach may also assist the 
South African Government in the UNHRC to reconsider how it has been voting on the Council 
resolutions (2008-2010 and 2013-2015) that are specific to particular member states as will be 
elaborated in the subsequent chapters below particularly taking into consideration the broader 
scope of the South African foreign policy diplomacy post 1994.   
2.3. South African Government ratification and challenges in the UPR of the UNHRC and 
beyond 
2.3.1. Ratification phase of human rights documents in South Africa  
Despite the fact that South Africa’s democratic Government post 1994 signed and ratified 
international human rights documents such as UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR under the theme of 
International Bill of Rights as highlighted in chapter one and African Charter of Human and 
Peoples Rights of 1981 (ACHPR or the African Charter) regionally,55 it remains to be seen 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Africa’s foreign economic strategies in a changing global system’ (2015) 22 South African Journal of 
International Affairs 149.  
54 Johnson S & Mark N ‘The United Nations Institutions: A critical Analysis of Their Ability to Promote and 
Protect International Human Rights’ (2014) 15 NUCB JLCC 7-10.   
55 African Union ‘List countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (21 February 2013), available at 
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whether its actions in the UNHRC are in line with its obligations. For South Africa post 1994 
provided its prior apartheid unpromising history of human rights violations and thus the 
ratification of the above mentioned documents is important in order to reverse the injustices of 
the past because by their nature civil, political and social, economic and cultural rights are 
interrelated, interdependent and indivisibleas this reinforcing relationship was envisaged in the 
1968 Declaration of Tehran and 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Hence, the 
South African Government in 2015 took one step further by ratifying the ICESCR following its 
general signing of the instrument in 199456 because it has the responsibility to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil all human rights in the Bill of Rights as stipulated in section 7(2) of the 
1996Constitution.57 
In doing so, there is an understanding that comprehensive recognition or realisation of the 
interdependence between civil and political rights as well as socioeconomic rights domestically 
and internationally by South Africa is linked with its unpromising history of human rights 
violations prior 1994. However, whether or not if South Africa in the Council acted according to 
its values in the constitutional and foreign policy as embodied in its overall ratification of 
international human rights instruments post 1994 in the UPR process of the UNHRC before the 
actual voting patterns (2008-2010 and 2013-2015) is the subject of the following subsection. In 
this regard, the aim is to determine to what extent South Africa before being voted to serve in 
the Council fulfilled its obligations in the form of reporting and pledges as required generally 
from the UN members in order to access their human rights achievements and failures.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples'%20Rig
hts.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2015).  
56 See Petherbridge D ‘South Africa’s pending ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: What are the implications?’ SERAJ: Stellenbosch University Faculty of Law, 
(06 November 2006), available at http://blogs.sun.ac.za/seraj/2012/11/06/south-africas-pending-
ratification-of-the-international-covenant-on-economic-social-and-cultural-rights-what-are-the-implications/ 
(accessed 19 March 2015);Chenwi L, Dugard J &Durojaye E ‘SA Human Rights Groups welcomes the 
country’s ratification of the UN ICESCR’(20 January 2015)Community Law Centre Faculty of Law 
University of the Western Cape  available at http://communitylawcentre.org.za/news/sa-human-rights-
groups-welcomes-the-country2019s-ratification-of-the-un-icescr/?searchterm=None (accessed on 19 
March 2015) and Chapter Two of the 1996 Constitution.  
57 Vilgoen F and Orago N ‘An argument for South Africa’s accession to the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the light of its importance and 
implications’ (2014) PER/PELJ 2555. [Hereafter referred to as Vigoen and Orago]  
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This is because the respective accession of international treaties goes in line with obligations 
which require member states including South Africa to honour in the UNHRC. For instance, as 
highlighted in the previous section UN member states including South Africa are required to 
submit periodic reports to the international human rights treaty bodies as required by the 
progressive UPR of the UNHRC of 2006.58 
2.3.2. South Africa’s compliance to the UPR process 
The signing and ratification of international human rights documents creates the expectation 
that South Africa as a UN member states South Africa must comply with the terms and 
conditions of the international community, particularly those of reporting on human rights 
achievements and commitments.59 Informed by that notion, the South African Government in 
the events leading to its re-election to the UNHRC in the UPR report of 2008 presented what it 
had done in the realisation of human rights as embodied in the international human rights 
instruments that it signed and ratified.60 Therefore, the South African Government informed by 
the provisions of Article 64 of the UN Charter of 1945 had also outlined what it will do for 
further enhancement or fulfilment of human rights at the national and international level. 
For example, the Government of South Africa in the UPR process made reference to its colonial 
and apartheid histories and how they have contributed to the current “challenges”61 that it still 
                                                          
58 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Universal Periodic 
Review’, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx (accessed on 26 
July 2015).    
59 Article 64(1) & (2) of the UN Charter. 
60 South Africa’s country report to the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Mechanism: (15 
April 2008).  
61 These includes service delivery challenges such as housing, healthcare as well as water and sanitation 
as they were indicated in the cases before the Higher Court and Constitutional Court such as 
Government of Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); Minister of 
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 1) (CCT9/02) [2002] ZACC 16; 2002 (5) 
SA 703; 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (5 July 2002) and in the letter the Makhaza in Khayelitsha Cape Town and 
Rammulotsi Township in Free State Sagas of which government responded heavy handily against the 
protesters for service delivery and labour unrest leading to the killing of Andries Tatane and Marikana 
Massacre under the administration of President Jacob Zuma since 2009. This is because according to 
commentators the South African citizens are hopeless because if they communicate with either isiXhosa, 
English, Afrikaans, Sotho or Swati or isiZulu their grievances fall to the deaf ears of government so the 
only language that they think is easy to hear is getting to the street and protest in order for the services to 
be delivered [Zuern E ‘Contentious Democracy’, Chapter 5: ‘Contentious Democracy’ in Zuern E The 
Politics of Necessity: Community Organising and Democracy in South Africa (Critical Human Rights) 
(2011) 133]. In addition to that, some perceive the current service delivery issues in South Africa as 
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faces years in democracy, post 1994. Subsequently, in response to those challenges the South 
African Government outlined the steps that have been taken through “legislation”62 in the 
realisation of human rights as highlighted in the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution 
and International Bill of Rights embodied in the ICCPR and ICESCR.63  Furthermore, the 
significance of independent or autonomous Chapter Nine institutions64 of the Constitution of 
1996 has been recognized as tools that aimed at enhancing and strengthening rule of law, 
democracy and human rights in the democratic South Africa post 1994.65 Over and above that, 
the South African Government pledged to ratify all the left human rights documents of the 
international community in 2012.66 
Additionally, as per Resolution 5/1 of the UNHRC recommendations on the South African side 
as a norm have been made in terms of troika and other UPR reporting tools regarding where 
and how it can improve its human rights obligations nationally and internationally. These 
include the national reports of 2008 and 2012 submitted by South Africa in the UPR process; 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
debating back from 1996 when the democratic government under President Nelson Mandela and his then 
deputy Thabo Mbeki changed the economic policies from Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) which aimed to attack poverty, inequality and underdevelopment as the apartheid legacies to 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) of 1996 as the result of global international economic 
trends leaving tensions between those in the tripartite alliance (ANC, COSATU and SACP) up to late 
2007 when former President Mbeki was recalled as indicated in the writings of Habit A &Padayachee V 
‘Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy’ (2000) 28 World 
Development 252; and Roux A Everyone’s Guide to the South African Economy (2008) 9th ed. Cape 
Town. Zebra Press. 
62  They include the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998; National Health Act and several others.  
63South Africa’s Report to the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of 15 April 
2008 para. 6.  
64 State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy as embodied in Sections 181-194 of the South 
African Constitution Act 108 of 1994 include Public Protector, South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC),  Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities, Commission for Gender Equality and Auditor-General as well as Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC).  
65 South Africa’s Report to the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of 15 April 
2008, para. 5.    
66 South Africa’s Report to the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of 15 April 
2008,para.11; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (9 July 2012) Para. 34 and; 
Statement by Ms MaiteNkoana-Mashabane, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the 
Republic of South Africa, to the 16th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council Geneva, 
Switzerland, (28 February 2011), available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0228.html 
(accessed on 15 June 2015).These despite South Africa’s ratification of ICESCR include the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced 
Disappearance; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Optional 
Protocol to the CRC on the Use of Children in Armed Conflict.  
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compilations of the OHCHR on the human rights status of South Africa as required by paragraph 
5 of the annex to the Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21. In doing so, recommendations 
acceptable in terms of Annex A were made to the Government of South Africa regarding the 
promotion, protection and fulfilment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the 
attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
2.3.2.1. Recommendations made to South Africa and extent of compliance     
The significance of the ratification of ICESCR has been at the forefront of all recommendations 
made by several UN member states in the UNHRC on the UPR reporting process against the 
South Africa Government.67 These relate in particular to the developmental challenges that 
South Africa still faces such as poor primary/secondary education, health, growing the economy 
and creation of decent jobs, fighting corruption and crime and rural development and land 
reforms.68  Subsequently, following the National Assembly (NA) and National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) sittings regarding South Africa’s ratification of the ICESCR and its Optional 
Protocol in October 2012 in terms of section 231(2) of the South African Constitution,69 the 
South African Government at the beginning of the year 2015 ratified the ICESCR document.70 
Similarly, as entailed in the questions submitted in advance to the SuR, the South African 
Government was asked by Czech Republic and Denmark the reason for its failure to enact the 
legislation that criminalise the acts of torture as embodied in Article 1 of the 1984 Convention 
against Torture (CAT) and sexual violence against women as well as lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender violence (LGBT)”.71 Informed by these questions and in terms of section 231(4) of 
the Constitution, the South African Government enacted Act 13 of 2013 regarding Prevention of 
Combating and Torture of Persons in terms of Article 1 of CAT and in line with section 12(1)(d) 
                                                          
67 Annex A ‘Recommendations acceptable to South Africa paras. 124.21-124-56.  
68 National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21, (21 May-4 June 2012), para 3. Also see The Annual International Report of the SAHRC 
(2012) 2.      
69Vilgoen and Orago supra note 53, at 2575.  
70Chenwi L, Dugard J &Durojaye E ‘SA Human Rights Groups welcomes the country’s ratification of the 
UN ICESCR’(20 January 2015)Community Law Centre Faculty of Law University of the Western Cape  
available at http://communitylawcentre.org.za/news/sa-human-rights-groups-welcomes-the-country2019s-
ratification-of-the-un-icescr/?searchterm=None (accessed on 19 March 2015).  
71 Advance Questions to South Africa.  
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of the Constitution that criminalises torture and other related matters. However, on the 
homosexuality or LGBT legislations due to contradicting views on the related issues failed to 
pass the legislation that acutely criminalises intolerance due to varying reasons. According to 
commentators these include opposing perceptions on the LGBT issue alleged to be part and 
parcel of majority and minority rights in the 1996 South African Constitution.72 This is despite 
the fact that there is an abundance of cases daily in South Africa that indicate intolerance of 
homosexuals pointing to the direction of lack of legislation opposed on the basis redundancy 
and irrelevance when analysed from cultural relativism or conservatives perspectives.73 
Therefore, the South African Constitution, after the ratification stage of international treaties, 
expects the Government to incorporate the treaty’s obligations into domestic law after the 
approval of the NA and NCOP.74 
However, despite the above mentioned achievements in terms of complying with the 
international human rights obligations difficulties were experienced on other recommendations 
as they were declined by the South African Government on political grounds. These include in 
particular South Africa’s rejection of Canada’s allegations of sexual violence by South African 
peacekeeping missions on political grounds.75 This indicates that, although the South African 
Government partly accepted and acted upon some recommendations in the UPR process 
regarding human rights issues, the government became adamant on those that have a potential 
to compromise its national interests. Specifically, the denial of peacekeepers’ human rights 
violations by the South African Government of the recommendations is linked with South 
Africa’s little indication to take prominent actions against the offenders and the innocent 
                                                          
72Ilyayambwa M ‘Homosexual Rights and the Law: A South African Constitutional Metamorphosis’ (2012) 
2 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 50.  
73Ibid50.  
74Chenwi L’USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO PROMOTE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS: THE (POTENTIAL) ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT’ (2011) 15 LDD 3 
75  Annex C ‘Recommendations Rejected by South Africa: Violence against women and children, 
manifestations of domestic and social violence and human trafficking’. Also see A/HRC/21/16 ‘Report of 
the Working Group on the UPR: South Africa, (09 July 2013) para. 95.   
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victims of the unrests, on the one hand; while on the other hand driven by its Pan-Africanist 
agenda.76 
Likewise, according to the International Annual Report of the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) these allegations continue despite the fact that the NCOP’s Security and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee held public hearings from 18-21 September 2012.77 In this 
regard, numerous groups both from South Africa and abroad voiced significant criticism of the 
Traditional Courts Bill on giving authority to Home-Lands in contrast with Article 14 of the ICCPR 
and section 35(3) of the South African Constitution on fair trial.78 And also, on the grounds that 
it might have potential impact on the rights of women and other vulnerable groups, notably 
LGBT persons’ particularly affecting people living in rural areas.79 Nevertheless, these are 
against the background that the South African Government have been arguing in favour of the 
Gender parity since 1994 as embodied in the Constitution of South Africa and international 
human rights law.80 
Despite those consistencies and inconsistencies, it would be of greater significance to outline 
the examples of human rights challenges that arose in the South Africa’s international relations. 
In particular, some of the challenges as will be indicated arise as the result of the diversity in 
the South African foreign policy. 
2.4. Examples of human rights challenges in the South Africa foreign policy 
There are many human rights challenges that arose as the result of the diversity in the foreign 
policy of South Africa. Some of these challenges as will be indicated are linked with the broad 
nature of the South African foreign policy that is made up of trade, defence or security and 
                                                          
76Nathan L ‘Consistency and Inconsistencies in South African Foreign Policy’ (2005) 81 International 
Affairs362. 
77The Annual International Report of the SAHRC, (2012), 18. 
78 UN Watch and Human Rights Foundation, ‘Electing the 2014-2016 Members of the UN Human Rights 
Council: For presentation at United Nations Headquarters, New York’ (04 November 2014) 14. Also see 
Guardian “The traditional courts bill threatens LGBT South Africans” 26 May 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/26/south-africa-gay-lgbt-traditional (accessed on 31 
August 2015). 
79Ibid, at 14. 
80 A/HRC/21/16 ‘Report of the Working Group on the UPR: South Africa, (09 July 2013) para.30. Also see 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR on non-discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or gender etc.    
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human rights as represented by various government departments.81 Therefore, this diversity of 
South African foreign policy creates confusions when the Government is required to act on 
international human rights issues in the global stage particularly on countries that it has direct 
or indirect bilateral or arrangements.  
For instance, in the first glance, South Africa encountered challenges during its two tenures as 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent member in 2007-2008 and 2011-
2012 on the human rights cases of Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Libya.82 In doing so, the South 
African Government rejected resolutions of the UNSC on the grounds of Pan-Africanism 
embodied in the notion of African solution to African problems and bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements with countries such as China and Russia.83 The example of this is the South 
African Government denial of whether the Myanmar case of massive human rights violations 
was also equal to threat of international peace and security as embodied in Article 1 of the 
1945 UN Charter and belonging to the Security Council by referring the case to the UNHRC 
where its voting behaviour is inconsistent with its international human rights obligations as will 
be indicated in chapter three below on certain case studies.84 
Similarly, the South African Government refused Dalai Lama entrance visa several times since 
2009 on the grounds that it has bilateral relations with China that considers him to be a Splittist 
                                                          
81 These include such departments as International Relations and Cooperation, Trade and Industry as 
well as Defence and Parliament. For further details read Masters L “Opening the ‘black box’: South 
African foreign policy-making” Chapter 2, in Landsberg C & Van Wyk (eds) South African Foreign Policy 
Review, (2012) 27-32.)  
82 See Keally K ‘South African Foreign Policy: Implications for Democracy’ (09 November 2012), Council 
for a Community of Democracies, available 
athttp://www.ccd21.org/news/africa/south_africa_foreign_policy.html (accessed 23 April 2015). Also read 
Liebenberg I ‘War in disguise: the responsibility to protect (R2P) as a new means to armed aggression’ 
Chapter 15, in Potgieter T and Liebenberg I Reflections on War: Preparedness and Consequences 
(2012) 274-275.; Smith K ‘Soft power: The essence of South Africa’s foreign policy’, Chapter 4 in 
Landsberg C & Van Wyk (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review, (2012) 75; and Tladi D ‘Strict 
positivism, moral arguments, human rights and the Security Council: South Africa and the Myanmar vote’ 
(2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 27.   
83Nathan L ‘African Solutions to African Problems: South African Foreign Policy’ (2013) 51 South African 
Foreign Policy Initiative 1 and; Keally K ‘South African Foreign Policy: Implications for Democracy’ (09 
November 2012), Council for a Community of Democracies, available 
athttp://www.ccd21.org/news/africa/south_africa_foreign_policy.html (accessed 23 April 2015).  
84Tladi D ‘Strict positivism, moral arguments, human rights and the Security Council: South Africa and the 
Myanmar vote’ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 27. 
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or separatist because of seeking independence of Tibet from China.85 In the same vein, the 
South African Government has been gloomed by the scourge of xenophobia not for the first 
time since its democratic era after 1994. This intolerance against foreign nationals first surfaced 
in May 2008 and more recently in April 2015 undermining or tarnishing the international image 
of South Africa and its ubuntu founding values embodied in its Constitution and its foreign 
policy.86 
Similarly, the SAHRC welcomed the bringing to book of the South African Police Services (SAPS) 
officials who killed Mozambican man called Mido Macia after they dragged him behind the 
police vehicle to death. 87  As a result, the SAHRC acknowledged that the Macia issue 
compromised the diplomatic relations between Mozambique and South Africa.88 And more 
recently, South African Government failed to observe its ICC obligations as a member of the 
Rome Statute of 1998 after the executive branch of government disregarded Gauteng High 
Court ruling to effect arrest warrant of Al-Bashir following his AU attendance summit in South 
Africa in June 2015.89 
Lastly, these cases of human rights failures in the South African foreign policy as well as those 
that have been partly identified in the previous section, particularly on gender or sexuality 
issues are clear observations of South Africa’s failure to sufficiently fulfil its international 
obligations. In this regard, as also observed by the reports of the SAHRC particularly on equality 
issues between South African citizens themselves and foreign nationals reflect badly on the 
                                                          
85The Guardian ‘Dalai Lama denied South Africa visa for Nobel Summit’, (04 September 2014), The 
Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/04/dalai-lama-denied-south-africa-
visa-nobel-summit (accessed on 31 August 2015). 
86 South African National report  submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights 
Council Resolution 16/21, (07 March 2012),paras. 37-41. Also see South African History Online 
‘Xenophobic violence in Democratic South Africa’, South African History Online: towards a peoples 
history, available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa 
(accessed on 01 September 2015).    
87 ‘SAHRC welcomes conviction of former police officers in MidoMacia case’, available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.php?ipkMenuID=25&ipkArticleID=344 (accessed on 01 September 
2015).   
88Ibid. 
89deVos P ‘Opinion: Democracy Snuffed out by Arbitrary Decision Made in Self-Interest’, (26 June 2015), 
available at http://ewn.co.za/2015/06/26/OPINION-Pierre-de-Vos-Democracy-snuffed-out-by-arbitrary-
decisions-made-in-selfinterest (accessed on 27 June 2015).  
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image of the South African Government internationally post 1994.90 This is because South 
Africa’s approval of international documents on human rights comes with responsibilities that 
require UN member countries to act as expected on human rights issues at home and 
internationally.      
2.5. Conclusion  
Despite the fact that hopes were high in the reform of the UNCHR to UNHRC on the 
improvement in response to international human rights issues various issue emerged taking the 
Council back to the faults of its predecessor. These include challenges of politicization, 
selectivity, and double standards by the UN member states. Specifically, these were noticed 
before the Council by the inability to accept or conform to obligations of international human 
rights law by Iran, China and Gambia among others. Among the reasons raised by these 
countries in support of their non-compliance is the sovereign equality principle when issues are 
raised on religious intolerance being labelled as defamatory, therefore, rejecting the 
international community interference and its recommendations to resolve the immediate 
identified human rights violations. Consequently, this is even exacerbated by the formation of 
the UNHRC in spite of the fact it uses a criterion in its membership as indicated in the second 
section of this chapter, because the countries that are being elected when they are serving 
argue cases of self interests and now the submissions of faulty reports and their forcefully 
defence without the fear of accountability deteriorates the situation further.  
In particular, even those countries as will be indicated in the following chapter serve as the 
members of the UNHRC for a specific period in their voting patterns especially South Africa 
there is no concern for professionalism and adherence to their international human rights 
obligations. Hence the South African Government although partially complied with the 
minimum standards of compliance in the UNHRC through ratifying necessary international 
human rights instruments (ICCPR and ICESCR without specific reservations and declarations) 
                                                          
90RDM News Wire ‘Right to equality violations persist in SA: SAHRC’, (25 June 2015), Rand Daily Mail, 
available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2015/06/25/Right-to-equality-violations-persist-in-SA-SAHRC 
(accessed on 30 August 2015). 
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and acted on recommendations despite rejecting some it had encountered many human rights 
challenges on its international relations related to realpolitik.  
These include Zimbabwe, Dalai Lama, Myanmar and more recently its failure to effect arrest of 
Sudanese leader on the basis of its international obligations of being a member of the ICC Rome 
Statute of 1998. Furthermore, due to domestic intolerance as the result of developmental 
challenges in South Africa over the competition of limited resources there was a xenophobic 
outbreak that led to the diplomatic deterioration between South Africa and other African 
countries especially Mozambique as a result of police allegedly killing of Mido Macia.  
Therefore, when these international and national challenges of human rights as will also be 
highlighted in the subsequent chapters base on how and why it had voted in a specific manner 
in the Council in periods of 2008-2010 and 2013-2015, it is clear that the South African 
Government acts according to its national interests rather than human rights obligations in the 
international human rights treaty bodies. The case mentioned in the previous paragraph and its 
inability to accept the Canadian recommendation against its peacekeeping missions that are 
accused of human rights abuses in defence of African solidarity are indications of the 
overreliance on self interests rather that human rights, therefore, politicizing, being selective 
and indicating elements of double standards in the UNHRC formal UN body of human rights.  
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Chapter 3 
3. The analysis of South Africa’s voting patterns in the UNHRC for the periods 2008-2010 and 
2013-2015 
3.1. Introduction 
The lack of professionalism or selectivity that destroyed the UNCHR seems to persist even in 
the newly founded progressive UNHRC of 200691 as indicated in the previous chapters. Instead 
of helping to consolidate the international human rights body because of the important role 
that South Africa played in the formation of UNHRC in 2006;92 the South African Government 
seems to worsen the situation. However, how South Africa contributed in the mentioned 
problems of selectivity and unprofessionalism in the UNHRC will be measured based on how 
the Government voted on the human rights resolutions of the periods 2008 to 2010 and 2013 
to 2015 respectively. This is because as will be indicated below the South African Government 
voting patterns in the UNHRC (2008 to 2010 and 2013 to 2015) pertaining allegations of human 
rights violations by specific member states before the Council reflects elements of politicization 
and double standards in favour of the national interests at the expense of its human rights 
obligations.  
Therefore, in going about assessing the voting patterns of South Africa in the Council, it is going 
to be of greater significance to investigate what inform a particular way of voting based on how 
the Council is structured and who or which countries are dominating in the body from what or 
which geographic or political region of the world as highlighted in chapter two in the first Part 
of this chapter. This will further be followed by the voting methods in the UNHRC in Part two of 
the chapter, therefore, after that in the third Part the analysis will be conducted on the basis of 
how South Africa voted in 2008 to 2010 and 2013 to 2015 in the Council during its tenures. The 
manner in which South Africa voted and why it had voted in a particular way towards a specific 
member state in the Council will be measured on the bases of its human rights foreign policy 
                                                          
91 Freedman R ’The United Nations Human Rights Council: More of the same?’ (2013) 13 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 208.  [hereafter referred to as Freedman] 
92 Advertorial, ‘Protecting human rights in Africa’, (26 June 2014), Mail and Guardian Online, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-26-protecting-human-rights-in-africa (accessed on 17 June 2015). 
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objectives as well as its internationally expected human rights obligations. Thus, in case human 
rights cases of particular member states have glided across the two tenures (i.e. 2008 to 2010 
and 2013 to 2015), it would be significant to analyse how and why the South African 
Government voting behaviour have changed in the subsequent period of the study.  
3.2. Brief overview of the UNHRC structure and possibilities of politicization: South Africa 
Case study 
Despite the fact that UNHRC is different from the UNSC and GA because it is more professional, 
UN member states including South Africa seem to always find it difficult not politicise or be 
selective on the resolutions of the Council on human rights. To validate this point, it is of 
greater significance to revisit the formation of the UNHRC itself. For instance, as indicated in 
the previous chapter that, the Council’s 47 member states comprises different regional bodies 
that were created on a geographical, political, economical, social or cultural basis. Therefore, 
reliance on these groupings by member states implies that selectivity and politicization of 
UNHRC resolutions is inevitable in light of the regional groups as identified in the literature 
review section of chapter one such as NAM, OIC, and Group of 77(G77).93 
In addition to that, they are informed by the theme of New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) that unites developing countries across the geographic spectrum because they advocate 
for South-South formations such as India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (BRICS) and NEPAD where the South African Government has a 
membership.94 Thus, the loyalty to these groupings consistently informs the voting patterns of 
member countries in the UNHRC as this will be analysed in this chapter below on the South 
African Government in the 2008 to 2010 and 2013 to 2015 of the Council membership. 
According to Abebe,95 the South African politicization of the UNHRC comes from the general 
allusion of all African states arguing that, even the formation of the UN international 
                                                          
93  Freedman R United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critical Critique and Early Assessment 
(Unpublished PHD thesis, University of London 2011) 169-172.   
94 Jordaan E ‘South Africa, Multilateralism and the Global Politics of Development’ (2012) 24 European 
Journal of Development Research 283. 
95 See Abebe supra note 29, at 2.  
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organisations such as the Commission which is currently the Council was unfair because many 
African countries were still under colonialism and apartheid.96 As a result, at times, the heated 
debate on the creation of the UNHRC was particularly influenced by the classical conflict of 
developing an effective international human rights system on the one hand and the 
preservation of national sovereignty on the other.97 In this regard, the politics of dissatisfaction 
in the GA and UNSC which are characterised by selectivity, double standard and politicization in 
the Commission, now in the UNHRC are setting it up for failure with the South African 
Government that contributes to that in the form of its counterproductive voting patterns as will 
be shown below. 
Part of the reasons why the South African Government is contributing to the politicisation of 
the UNHRC decisions may be that of African solidarity as embodied in the African Group in the 
Council as well as its ambitions of leading or representing the African continent in the UNSC 
where there is no African country that has a permanent sit.98 In addition to that, South Africa 
does so through abstaining or voting against on resolutions by the Council that require 
international community intervention in protection of its bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
as embodied in multilateral institutions like BRICs, IBSA and others as indicated above. In this 
regard, the South African Government has been alleged as siding with countries that are known 
for dubious human rights record in the Council by faith or religious leaders.99 In doing so, South 
Africa is deviating from its founding values embodied in chapter two of the Constitution the Bill 
of Rights and its international pledges and commitments that it had made during its 
candidature to the UNHRC membership as outlined in chapter two of this paper. 
Therefore, the challenges of politicization, selectivity and regionalism on thematic human rights 
resolutions of the UNHRC although deviating from its domestic and international human rights 
law that govern South African Government are inevitable and it is of greater significance to 
                                                          
96  Freedman R United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critical Critique and Early Assessment 
(Unpublished PHD thesis, University of London 2011) 172.   
97 Spohr M ‘United Nations Human Rights Council: Between Institution-Building Phase and Review of 
Status’ (2010) 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 170.  
98 White Paper on South Africa foreign policy (11 May 2011) 20-32. 
99  Makgoba T ‘New struggle to protect our human rights culture’, (22 March 2015), The Sunday 
Independent, available at http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/new-struggle-to-protect-our-human-
rights-culture-1.1835413#.Vk3gB9IrLs0 (accessed on 24 June 2015). 
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investigate how they have been manifested on a case-by-case basis. This is also due to the fact 
that, even the sponsoring of certain resolutions by individual or groups of states in the Council 
are informed by ulterior motives that lead to double standards that undermine the 
international monitoring of human rights at large.  
3.3. Methodology of the UNHRC and South African case study status 
As indicated in the previous chapter, candidate countries to the UNHRC membership are 
required to submit voluntary pledging documents outlining what they have done and what they 
will do or ought to do in order to enhance the promotion, protection and fulfilment of 
fundamental freedoms in the international scene. Thus, as required by the GA Resolution 
60/215 of March 2006, South Africa has submitted the voluntary pledging documents to the 
UPR of the UNHRC in 2008 and 2012 during its candidature to the Council membership as 
indicated in chapter two.100 According to the Joint Report of the Freedom House and UN Watch 
this helps the Council to assess whether the candidate countries qualify to serve in the Council 
membership as reflected on their human rights record nationally as that will hopefully be 
transpired to the international stage as well.101 In a nutshell, the Council requires countries that 
will lead by example in its membership in order for it to easily be able to execute well its 
international human rights duties professionally.  
However, despite the fact that South Africa’s1994 first democratic elections created 
anticipation to the international community that the democratic South African Government will 
play an important role in the advancement of democracy and human rights, recently in the 
UNHRC that seems to fade to some degree. Yet, this is different from the notion of South 
Africa’s peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy and existence of human rights 
provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution created the expectation that democratic 
government in South Africa will consistently respect, protect and promote human rights at 
                                                          
100 South Africa’s Report to the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of 15 April 
2008 and A/HRC/WG.6/13 ‘South Africa National Report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5of the 
annex to Human Rights Council\ Resolution 16/21’ 07 March 2012. 
101 Evaluation of 2008-2011 UN Human Rights Council Candidates: Joint Report by Freedom House and 
UN Watch Presented at the UN Headquarters, (06 May 2008), available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Eval2008HRC.pdf (accessed on 02 August 2015).   
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home and internationally as stipulated in Section 7(2) of the Constitution. In this regard, 
reflecting on the international human rights status of South Africa is of greater significance 
provided its unpromising history and commitment to change that post 1994. 
Nevertheless, the South African Government human rights status is still “questionable”,102 
perhaps because of certain human rights failures (Zimbabwe, Myanmar and China etc) at the 
international stage as highlighted in chapter two and assessing whether this persisted in the 
Council’s resolutions based on how the Government voted in the periods 2008 to 2010 and 
2013 to 2015. This as a backdrop brings us to the question of how the voting is conducted in the 
UNHRC and in particular focus to the South African Government voting patterns as a member. 
In this regard, how the South African Government voted in the UNHRC will be measured on the 
basis of yes or in favour, no or against and abstain or absent when South Africa did not vote in 
favour or against the Council’s resolution of human rights. Therefore, this will be indicated 
below on the UNHRC country-specific resolutions from 2008 to 2010 as well as 2013 to 
2015separately in the following section of the chapter.  
3.3.1. South Africa’s voting patterns in the UNHRC resolutions in the period 2008 to 2010 
This section deals specifically with the voting patterns of the South African Government in the 
Council and attempts to analyse the rationale behind a particular voting behaviour on specific 
countries brought before the UNHRC for human rights abuses. The countries that are specific to 
the period of 2008 to 2010 are Israel, North Korea, Sri Lanka as well as Sudan and Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). Therefore, how the South African Government voted and why will be 
analysed on a case-by-case basis below starting from the case study of Israel.  
3.3.1.1. Israel 
Heinze argues that since the end of World War II, human rights have gained recognition not 
only as legal norm, but as criteria of political legitimacy.103 However, despite those international 
achievements the Government of Israel has been called before the international human rights 
                                                          
102 Ibid. 
103  Heinze E ‘Even-handedness and the politics of human rights’ (2008) 21 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 7. [hereafter referred to as Heinze]   
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bodies because of its allegedly violation of thereof. Therefore, although it is unprofessional to 
be selective before the Council, it has been identified that since the 2006 Israel-Lebanon 
conflict, widely published reports of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Human Rights 
Watch among others only denounced the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) for cross-border strikes 
that have claimed lives of innocent people (civilians) without condemning the Hezbollah 
violations.104 These alleged violations occur despite the fact that Israel undertook steps to 
prosecute and committed itself to punishing the abuses across ranks and seniority through 
adopting structural reform to reduce impunity and increase accountability.105 
Freedman106 argued that the Council fell to the same trap of its predecessor because in its first 
six years of existence, it had disproportionately focused on Israel and lacked even-handedness 
in its treatment of Israel. Thus, whether Israel was the most targeted state by the UNHRC is 
determined by the number of resolutions enacted considering human rights allegations arose in 
the Council because according to the 2006-2008 statistics Israel has been the most targeted 
country compared with others countries of the similar status of human rights violations.107 
Therefore, since the interest of this study is on how and why South Africa voted in a particular 
manner during its tenure in the Council, the analysis of its voting patterns and record will be 
considered in relation to its ratification and human rights foreign policy objectives post 1994. 
For example, since 2008 until the end of South Africa’s tenure in June 2010 in the UNHRC, 
about 19 resolutions were sponsored before the UNHRC against Israel’s human rights abuses 
on its occupied territories whereby 17 were adopted with a vote on which the South African 
Government consistently voted in favour of all of them.108  In particular, these human 
resolutions emanates from Israel’s military attacks and incursions in Occupied Territories of 
                                                          
104 Human Rights Watch, Fatal Strikes: Israel’s indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Lebanon’ (2006) 
available athttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lebanon0806webwcover.pdf (accessed on 07 
October 2015).   
105 Israel 2014 Human Rights Report, at 2.  
106 Freedman supra note 85, at 208.   
107 Selignman S ‘Politics and Principle at the UN Human Rights Commission and Commission (1992-
2008)’ (2011) 17 Israel Affairs 527. [hereafter referred to as Selignman] 
108  See Anti-Israel Resolutions at the HRC (2007-2008, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010), available at 
http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.3820041/#2nd (accessed on 23 July 2015). 
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Palestine, Syrian Golan and Humanitarian Boat Convoy as well as follow-up resolutions.109And 
they are sponsored by such countries as Pakistan, Belarus, Cuba, and Democratic Peoples’ 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria 
among others in solidarity with their group members in the UNHRC and against Israel’s 
allegedly discriminatory activities.110 
It can therefore be argued that these countries that sponsor the UNHRC resolutions hold 
grudges against Israel because they are coming from states in the groups such as Arab or 
Islamic Groups, African Group, NAM or OIC on which South Africa has membership in some of 
them hence its in favour or vote yes voting patterns as will explained further below why South 
African Government vote in that manner on Israel. For example, in the resolution brought 
before the Council by Pakistan among other countries against Israel because of indiscriminate 
IDF attacks in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Gaza Strip; a resolution was adopted by 31 
votes including South Africa against 1 rejection and 13 abstentions.111 Therefore, the solidarity 
with countries experiencing the same kind of human rights violations in the same way those 
abuses were occurring in South Africa during apartheid and Pan-africanism is the reason why it 
is voting yes or in favour in the Council.  
Furthermore, the democratic South African Government’s bias voting patterns in the UNHRC 
against Israel can also be traced from its historical relationship with the apartheid regime 
following the visit of the then Prime Minister of South Africa Balthazar Johannes Vorster in April 
1976 and recent diplomatic deterioration between these two countries because of Israel 
actions in Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.112 Furthermore, South Africa’s selective voting patterns 
against Israel as the result of the above reasons is also not foreign from the number of 
                                                          
109 Ibid. 
110 Israel 2014 Human Rights Report, at 1. 
111  A/HRC/7/1 ‘Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and incursions in the 
Occupied Palestinian territory, particularly the recent ones in the occupied Gaza Strip’ (06 March 2006), 
available at http://www.unwatch.org/atf/cf/%7B6deb65da-be5b-4cae-8056-
8bf0bedf4d17%7D/A_HRC_RES_7_1.PDF (accessed on 23 July 2015). 
112 Kane A ‘Unspoken alliance: Israel’s secret relationship[ with apartheid South Africa’ (06 December 
2013), Mondoweiss, available at http://mondoweiss.net/2013/12/alliance-relationship-apartheid (accessed 
on 07 October 2015) and Levitas B “Hijacking South Africa’s foreign policy on Israel” (15 August 2012), 
SAFPI, available at http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/hijaking-south-africa-s-foreign-policy-israel 
(accessed on 07 October 2015).  
 43 | P a g e  
 
resolution brought before the Council within the short space of time since 2006 as highlighted 
in the beginning sections of this subsection on Israel.  
Therefore, South Africa’s voting record on Israel and the Council’s obsession with Israel in this 
regard equals politicization of the Israel human rights issue. This is because there are no views 
or complaints on the other side especially those of the occupying Israel that seemed to be 
taken into consideration by the Council as it was the case during the era of the Commission.113 
In this regard, whether politicization or selectivity has always been the case on the side of 
South African Government will be assessed on other case studies.  
3.3.1.2. North Korea  
According to RhetoricaNum114 the North Korean human rights issue has been in the UN human 
rights bodies (the Commission) since 2005 until 2006 when the UNHRC came into existence. 
Consequently, it led to the enactment of the resolution aimed at resolving the human rights 
situation in that country.115 In particular, North Korea has a bad record in the UNHRC because 
of its consistent human rights violations such as restriction of freedom of expression and 
suppression of opinion or any form of organised political opposition, independent media and 
free trade unions, civil society organisations or religious freedom.116 
Subsequently, all those who assert their rights have been consistently arbitrarily arrested, 
detained and treated inhumanly despite the fact that DPRK had signed and ratified 
international human rights treaties such as ICCPR, ICESCR, the Convention on the Rights of the 
                                                          
113 Selignman supra note 103, at 533.  
114 RhetoricaNum ‘United Nations Human Rights Office of the Higher Commissioner: UNHRC Background 
Guide” (2015), available at 
http://rhetoricamun.weebly.com/uploads/5/3/4/7/53474781/new_study_guide_of_unhrc.pdf (accessed on 
07 October 2015).     
115 Human Rights Resolution 2005/11: Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (14 April 2005), United Nations Commission on Human Rights, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45377c2dc.html (accessed on 07 October 2015).  
116 RhetoricaNum ‘United Nations Human Rights Office of the Higher Commissioner: UNHRC Background 
Guide” (2015), available at 
http://rhetoricamun.weebly.com/uploads/5/3/4/7/53474781/new_study_guide_of_unhrc.pdf (accessed on 
07 October 2015).     
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Child (CRC) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.117 
This is because North Korean Government has always been adamant to reform its legal 
processes to be aligned with those of the international community as required by the accession 
to the international human rights instruments in order to execute its duties effectively.118 
Furthermore, North Korea is known as a world’s secretive and in accessible country particularly 
because of its traditional ways of reporting and monitoring human rights because it does not 
give access to experts especially the UN Special Rapportuer on Human Rights and UN Higher 
Commissioner on Human Rights and NGOs. 119  Hence, its controversial actions are the 
determination of a socialist state that is clingy about issues of sovereignty and proletarian 
dictatorship.120 
Thus, since 2006 in the UNHRC despite the South African Government accession to 
international human rights instruments its consistent abstention voting patterns on all 
resolutions against North Korea is contradictory because it a democratic state since 1994 
believing on human rights and democracy.121 And most importantly, in the period 2008 to 2010 
on the resolutions of the UNHRC against North Korea, the South African Government abstained 
in March 2008.122 In the same vein, the South Africa Government on the resolution of March 
2010 adopted by the Council with 28 to 8, with 13 abstentions, South Africa including other 
African countries such as Angola, Cameroon and Nigeria have been noted abstaining.123 
Therefore, a variety of reasons behind the South African Government voting pattern on the 
case of North Korea can be provided although others do not have a direct link with the UNHRC 
because they are domestic in nature.  
                                                          
117Human Rights Resolution 2005/11: Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (14 April 2005), United Nations Commission on Human Rights, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45377c2dc.html (accessed on 07 October 2015).  
118Report on Human Rights in North Korea (2014), at 30-31. 
119Cohen R ‘Human Rights in North Korea: Addressing the Challenges’ (2013) 22 International Journal of 
Korean Unification Studies 32.  
120Report on Human Rights in North Korea (2014), at 4. , 
121Jordaan E ‘South Africa and Abusive Regimes at the UN Human Rights Council’ (2014) 20 Global 
Governance 243. 
122In the resolution of the UNHRC of 27 March 2008 that recorded vote of 22 to 7, with 18  Abstentions, 
South Africa with other 6 African countries in the Council abstained on the resolution calling for Special 
Repporteur as identified in the A/HRC/7/15 ‘Situation of human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. 
123A/HRC/13/14 ‘Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (15 April 2010). 
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For example, the South African Government voting patterns regarding North Korea can be 
traced from recent developments in the ruling ANC that have controversially introduced the 
Protection of State Information Bill or Secrecy Bill in 2011 in the NA on the basis that media 
needs to be seized since it always criticizes the ANC government decisions.124 However, this in 
turn led to the outcry or excessive criticism of the media in general by those on the left of 
‘tripartite alliance’,125 particularly the South African Communist Party (SACP) Secretary General 
and South African Government Minister of Higher Education and Training Dr Blade Nzimande 
among others currently in Government, calling an Independent Media Tribunal in South Africa 
to regulate print media.126 
Therefore, these controversial voting patterns of South Africa on human rights situation in 
North Korea are attached with the recent developments in the political landscape of South 
Africa. Likewise, the commentators confirmed the rationale behind South Africa’s three 
abstentions since 2008 to 2010 in the UNHRC regarding human rights problems in North Korea 
since South Africa itself expressed regret for its unwillingness to cooperate with the Council and 
to continue the mandate of Special Rapporteur on human rights situation in that country as 
highlighted above.127 This as backdrop is a clear that the South Africa is running away from its 
obligations as the UNHRC member because as indicated in the previous chapters it had signed 
and ratified international binding documents that require South Africa to honour its 
international and domestic duties on human rights because failure to do so would require the 
international community to act against such inappropriate behaviour. 
                                                          
124 Human Rights Watch ‘South Africa: “Secrecy Bill” Improved but Still Flawed’ (29 April 2013), available 
at https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/29/south-africa-secrecy-bill-improved-still-flawed (accessed on 07 
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Furthermore, these tactics by the South African democratic Government post 1994 slightly glide 
towards the direction of those of the apartheid regime style of controlling the media. For this 
reason, the controlling of the media and detention without trial by the North Korea 
Government are against the ICCPR provisions in Articles 7, 10, 18 and 19. And the South African 
Government voting record on North Korea, it is clear that South Africa had abandoned its own 
domestic and international laws because it has a duty to vote in a manner that confirms its 
obligations to respect protect, promote and fulfil as stipulated in its 1996 Constitution in the 
Council.128 The rights that the North Korean Government is breaching are respected, protected, 
promoted and ought to be fulfilled in terms of the South African Constitution and have been 
domesticated by the South African Government informed by Section 231 of the Constitution 
governing South Africa’s international agreements, although its voting patterns indicate 
indifference in their violations.  
Accordingly, whether the South African Government consistently votes in this manner on 
resolutions of the UNHRC will remain to be seen on other case studies such as DRC, Sudan and 
Sri Lanka below. In particular, this will be seen taking into consideration the duties that South 
Africa has in terms of its domestic and international human rights law. 
3.3.1.3. Sri Lanka 
Despite the fact that Sri Lanka ratified major international human rights instruments such as 
ICCPR and ICESCR in 1980;129 there were still cases of human rights violations until 2009. These 
include war crimes and crimes against humanity despite the fact that when the civil war ended 
in 2009 expectations were high regarding human rights improvement in that country.130 In 
particular, these occur despite the fact that positive strides such as lifting of media restrictions 
ordering review of the case of political prisoners and amendment of the Constitution where 
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some of the presidential powers as well as restoration of independence of public service 
commissions were endorsed and implemented.131 
Moreover, in the events leading to its election to serve in the Council, the Sri Lankan 
Government pledged to commit on the implementation of recommendations from UN bodies 
when it joined the UNHRC in 2006, although it notably failed to do so because it refused to 
confront the problems of torture and enforced disappearance.132 Despite that, when the Sri 
Lankan Government pledged to commit on human rights since it had ratified the major human 
rights documents and as per the recommendations on that country, it is inappropriate to see 
there is still no notice able evidence of human rights improvement as was expected by the 
international community. This is because if the Sri Lankan Government campaign was 
successful to serve in the Council as a member that would have compromised the credibility of 
the Council on the basis that its participation in the UNHRC was aimed at defending itself rather 
to improve its human rights situation at home.  
Consequently, apart from being let down by other UN member countries, the Sri Lankan 
Government was “disqualified” by NGOs in 2008 to serve in the UNHRC as a member pointing 
specifically to its dubious human rights record domestically.133 And also, shortly after the end of 
Sri Lanka’s bloody civil war, countries such as Mauritius and Mexico led the group of seventeen 
countries calling for the special session on the human rights situation on 26-27 May 2009 in the 
UNHRC.134 However, if Sri Lanka managed to served in the Council despite its human rights and 
humanitarian status, it was going to take the Council back to the failures of its predecessor 
where member states were entering the Commission to protect themselves as indicated in 
chapter one.135 Despite that, the South African Government worked with the Sri Lankan 
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Government by protecting it from being accountable for human rights violations through 
abstaining in the UNHRC country-specific resolution.136 
Therefore, it can be said that the South African Government actions were counterproductive. 
For instance, the former Higher Commissioner for Human Rights in the UN Navi Pillay pointed 
out three areas of concerns to be considered on the Sri Lankan human rights situation. These 
include “internal displacement of 200,000 people locked in camps as a result of government 
forces attempt to locate rebellions; having little regard for human rights of civilians and the 
need for humanitarian assistance because of gross disregard of international humanitarian 
law”.137 Notwithstanding that, on its draft resolution Sri Lankan Government emphasized that it 
remains the responsibility of the Government to clampdown Liberal Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) as a sovereign state and promised to resolve the issue of internally displaced people 
within the space of six months.138 
In this regard, Sri Lanka’s reliance on sovereignty instead of resolving humanitarian and human 
rights issues by itself was rejected by Permanent Representative of Germany despite in vain 
because Cuba’s proposal to end the debate on Sri Lanka was adopted by 22-17, with 7 
abstentions that saw South Africa voting in favour of closing the discussion.139 Furthermore, it 
was also noted that from the African Group, Mauritius was the only country that voted against 
Cuba’s motion although Sri Lanka’s resolution was defeated with the adoption of 29 to 12, with 
6 abstentions that highlighted the South African Government voting in favour of the most 
original sponsors of the special session voting against.140 
Provided that, it is safe to argue that the South African Government voting patterns in the Sri 
Lankan Government human rights issue were informed by the bilateral relations that South 
Africa and Sri Lanka has which mainly saw the light in 2013 when the South African President 
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Jacob Zuma attended the Commonwealth Conference in Sri Lanka.141 In addition to that, it is 
clear that from the South African Government perspective as implied by South Africa’s voting 
patterns in the Council, human rights and democracy are no longer that important when the 
sacrifice is going to done in favour of national interests creating double standards that are no 
required in the formal body like UNHRC of 2006. Therefore, if that is the case, these actions 
undermine the role that human rights accountability could play in the enhancement of national 
interests while at the same time the genuine essence of the Council is undermined for short-
term goals that have little regard for promotion and protection of human rights.  
In contrast, whether South Africa persists with placing forward its national interests at the 
expense of international human rights will be measured on other case studies such as Sudan as 
well as DRC below. However, of paramount importance in these case studies is their geographic 
location in Africa. Therefore, these countries are situated where the South African Government 
is pushing or preaching solidarity through African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism, since South 
Africa perceives itself as better positioned country in the continent to represent the African 
interests in the UNSC as highlighted elsewhere in the paper.  
And most importantly, owing to how the South African Government voted on resolutions 
regarding human rights situations in these UN and AU member states in the UNHRC will be 
determined by South Africa’s political, economic and social role in the African continent 
initiatives. These include the reform of Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) of 1963 to AU of 
2002, NEPAD and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).142 Central to the development of 
these initiatives to promote peace and security on the one hand and to enhance democracy, 
rule of law and human rights and development on the other in Africa generally.  
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3.3.1.4. Darfur and Sudan 
Despite the fact that since July 2004 strides were made to resolve the human rights situation in 
Sudan, many challenges have been encountered. In particular, rape or persistence of gang rape 
cases committed by members of the security force of Sudan and rebellions was identified as 
among human rights violations in the Darfur region.143 This persisted despite the fact that the 
joint communiqué between Sudan Government and the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
agreed that Sudanese Government should establish in May 2005 the State Committee on 
Combating Gender Based Violence in Southern Darfur and provide technical support to improve 
the investigative capacity of the law enforcement agencies.144 Those attempts failed to resolve 
the human rights situation in Darfur because violence still persisted in Sudan against women 
among other human rights abuses or crimes.  
For instance, in the fourth periodic report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 25 
July 2006 the crisis was witnessed deepening in Darfur despite Darfur’s Peace Agreement.145 In 
the same vein, on the Fifth and Sixth Reports killings of civilians by militia in Buran locality 
South Darfur and attack on villages around the Jubel Moon Area were observed. 146 
Furthermore, even in the reports from the seventh to the thirteenth, no progress was 
witnessed because human rights violations such as sexual abuses, civilian attacks, arbitrary 
arrest and detention were still committed until the year 2011 despite early peace 
agreements.147 
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Therefore, among the reasons hindering comprehensive international community intervention 
in the Sudanese crisis are the politics of regional organisations like AU within the UN Charter of 
1945 legal framework. For instance, in the African continent the influential role players like 
South Africa informed by Pan-Africanist values perceive themselves as the regional voice or 
mediators on conflicts against imperialism.148 Therefore, in turn they are consistently pushing 
for African solutions to African problems using the provisions of the UN Charter of 1945on 
regional peace arrangement to maintain peace and security in that country by themselves 
although little progress on democracy and human rights has been noticed.149 
For example, the South African Government has been in many peacekeeping missions in the 
African continent since 1998.150 In doing so, the South African Government intervened or 
participated on these missions informed by the African agenda that favours peaceful resolution 
of regional conflicts although failing to sufficiently realise the human rights issues faced by 
women and children on the ground.151 Therefore, the African agenda that is pushed by the 
South African Government and other African states is the determination of the stance that 
South Africa in the UNHRC resolutions particularly regarding countries situated in the 
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geographic region of Africa although that does little to the improvement of human rights in 
those individual African countries.  
However, despite after prompting from the then Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan, the 
Council held a special session on the human rights situation in Darfur on December 2006 which 
was signed by African states with the exception of South Africa and European states.152 Despite 
the fact that both African and European states agreed on the special session, few within the 
ranks of African Group and OIC defended Sudan. However, since the inception of the UNHRC in 
2006 many resolutions against Sudan were adopted, until 2008 when the Council passed a soft 
resolution in March 2008 that was followed by the other September resolution that wanted a 
Special Rapportuer.153 
As a result of European states proposal of an amendments to extend the mandate of the 
international community by one on the human rights situation in Sudan which was adopted by 
1 vote since 20-19, 8 voted in favour, against and abstained with the South African Government 
voting against the amendment.154 However, the African states from the African Group in the 
Council such as Zambia and Mauritius voted in favour of the resolution which was then passed 
by 2 votes since 20 countries voted in favour of the resolution, compared with 18 states voting 
against the amendment resolution and 9 abstaining witnessed the South African Government 
voting against and 6 other African countries in the Group abstaining.155 For and against this 
scattered voting behaviour between African and European countries, there are various several 
reasons that can be identified to give the understanding why South Africa voted in the manner 
in which it had voted in the Council.  
African countries led by Egypt on the one hand claimed that human rights situation in Sudan 
was better than the state it was characterised before, whereas, the European countries based 
on the field research done in Sudan noted that the situation in Khartoum was still ‘grim’ 
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because implementation of the expert groups recommendations was slow, therefore the 
mandate in Sudan should be extended by a particular period on the other.156 Despite that, the 
South African Government never said anything on whether or not the mandate was to be 
extended in order to curb and improve the human rights situation in Sudan.157 Therefore, South 
Africa’s voting stance and its quietness in the UNHRC on the human rights situation in Sudan is 
linked with its urgency for the extension of peacekeeping mission in Sudan because the former 
President Thabo Mbeki held the bilateral talks with Sudanese President Al Bashir in Cape Town 
in 2007 where both countries agreed to have defence, economic and trade cooperation 
relations.158 
Furthermore, former President Mbeki asserted that ‘Sudan is a strategic partner of South 
Africa’ in light of NEPAD developmental initiative and African Renaissance that was championed 
by the South African Government without taking into full cognizance the issue of human rights 
in that country.159 In particular, this is validated by the South African companies like PetroSA 
which since had been witnessed operating in the Sudanese soil.160 And, more recently, the 
South African Government failure to effect the arrest warrant of the Sudanese President on the 
basis that will hinder the relations between two countries and divide African continent at large 
because Al Bashir is a Head of State following his attendance of the AU summit in Johannesburg 
in June 2015.161 Therefore, the presumption that Sudanese President will attend the Forum on 
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China Africa Co-operation (Focac) in South Africa as of December 2015 following President 
Zuma’s international relations talk held in Pretoria.162 
Subsequently, all these examples indicated above show that the South African Government is 
disregarding its international obligations that are embodied in the International Bill of Rights, 
the Rome Statute that governs the ICC and its Constitution at the expense of national interests. 
Additionally, South Africa also undermines the doctrine separation of powers that allows the 
branches of the South African Government to check and balance on each others’ activities in 
the realisation of rights and responsibilities embodied in the Constitution on domestic and 
international matters. Therefore, South Africa failed to observe the rule of law, democracy and 
human rights as well as ubuntu that guides the South African foreign policy diplomacy because 
that set a bad precedence for South Africa and is an indication of betrayal of its values that it 
had learned from its peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994.  
Furthermore, instead of helping to improve the human rights in the international institutions 
particularly the Council because it has politicized and has been selective on its voting patterns 
in the Council resolutions pertaining to Sudan, South Africa contributed to the problems that 
destroyed the Commission. Hence its actions are likely to bring the international community 
into disrepute and undermine the role that the veneration and protection of human rights can 
contribute to the enhancement of all other international relations activities such as political, 
social and economic partnerships between countries.  
Now that, South Africa voted in partly voted in solidarity with African countries as indicated 
above due to various reasons, it is important to see whether there is a consistency on how it is 
voting on other African countries like DRC in the Council as will be indicated below. 
 
  
                                                          
162 See Hurtled T ‘Basher could return to SA in December’, (15 September 2015), News24, available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Bashir-could-return-to-SA-in-December-20150915 (accessed 
on 23 September 2015), and Republic of South Africa ‘International Relations’, available at 
http://www.gov.za/about-sa/international-relations (accessed on09 October 2015).     
 55 | P a g e  
 
3.3.1.5. DRC 
The Government of DRC signed and ratified major international human rights documents on 
the 1st of November 1976,163 despite that human rights situation in that country is not 
improving although its international human rights obligations requires that. This is because 
following the discovery of mass graves in Eastern DRC in 2005, the international community 
announced its intention to send a human rights team to report on the human rights situation in 
that country.164 As a result of that, Amnesty International proposed to the UNHRC in 2008 the 
special session to deal with a number of human rights issues in Eastern DRC such as internal 
displacement of people that rose to over a million, sexual violence and recruitment of child 
solders.165 According to Amnesty International these issues amount to human rights violations 
and international humanitarian law issues, therefore, the government of DRC is to be blamed 
for failing to facilitate reforms in mining, justice and security as well as international donors for 
not assisting on reforms.166 
Therefore, it was against this backdrop that the French Government at the behest of the EU 
proposed in vain a draft resolution calling for nine different special procedures to investigate 
the problems of human rights in the Eastern DRC which was unfortunately superseded by that 
of the African Group.167 The French Government proposal of resolution in the Council was 
following the continuity of the conflict and aimed at ending the riots in the Eastern province of 
DRC. However, despite the fact that the human rights situation was still grim in DRC, the South 
African Government simply acknowledged the violations although it has never taken actions 
aimed at improving the human rights situation in that country in the UNHRC through for 
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instance voting in a specific way that contribute to the improvement or reversing the 
situation.168 
As a result, in March 2009 human rights situation in DRC was identified as deteriorating as per 
seven thematic mandate holders’ reports.169 In particular, abuses such as arbitrary execution, 
sexual violence, abduction and pillaging were still found to be hot issues in the DRC despite 
international condemnation.170 Therefore, French’s proposal was a direct response to these 
human rights issues although it failed to restore a country mandate in the Council in order to 
cease human rights violations in DRC. 
However, during that time the African Group tabled a resolution using a procedural vote which 
was adopted with 30-15, 2 abstentions where the South African Government in solidarity with 
African countries and other related groups as identified elsewhere above in this chapter was 
witnessed voting in favour to make its text the basis of discussion.171 Although the African 
Group’s draft resolution was weak to resolve the human rights situation in the DRC because it 
eliminated some important EU’s package of amendments that aimed to address the situation 
by 18-21, with 8 abstentions since five of the African states including South Africa opposing the 
amendments.172 Instead, the South African Government voted for a weak resolution that was 
adopted by 33-0, with 14 abstentions.173 Consequently, the human rights situation in DRC 
deteriorated despite attempts aimed at resolving the situation were made as a result of 
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conflicts of interests between African countries and European countries on what should be 
done in response to the human rights situation in DRC.174 
There are several reasons that can be identified as the rationale behind voting patterns of the 
South African Government in the UNHRC on the DRC human rights situation in the period 2008 
to 2010. These include as highlighted in the Sudanese case study the South African Government 
participation in the peacekeeping missions since 1994; its ambitions of transforming or 
reformation of the UNSC as well as asserting African solidarity.175 In addition to that, the South 
African Government has its own bilateral relations with the Government of DRC which led to 
South Africa contributing to the infrastructure development because these countries also 
agreed to work together in the areas of economics and development as there are South African 
mining companies that are doing business in that country particularly in the mining sector.176 
Therefore, in this study the author argues that South Africa’s position in the UHRC regarding 
the DRC human rights situation is informed by its urgency to protect its national interests in 
that country at the expense of human rights forgetting the fact that these factors have 
elements of reinforcing each other.  
3.4. Collective analysis of the 2008 to 2010 period 
Based on the above discussions, it can argue that the South African Government is violating its 
responsibilities that are attached in the signing and ratification of international human rights 
documents through politicising UNHRC resolutions. Additionally, the South African Government 
made its pledges and commitments before the Council as indicated in the previous chapter a 
rhetoric since its selectivity has been identified from the Israel case study on its occupied 
territories without taking into consideration the violations of the occupied Palestine to Israel 
among others. However, this is against the background that in the Israeli case its voting 
patterns were identified as informed by its links with the Apartheid regime before 1994, now 
that on the DRC case study because of its national interests rather than human rights. 
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In the same vein, on the North Korean and Sri Lankan Governments case studies of human 
rights before the Council, the South African Government voted controversially. For instance, as 
indicated on these case studies South Africa abstained on their resolutions requiring country-
scrutiny by the UNHRC in defence of its bilateral relations and recent developments at home 
that makes the South African Government associate itself with countries those known for 
dubious human rights records. This is because South Africa ruled by the ANC is no longer 
satisfied by how the mass media particularly the printing is covering government failures 
alleging the inability to publish on government achievements. 
And most importantly, South Africa now perceives the protection of its bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements vested on those countries that have been brought before the Council as 
superseding its international human rights obligations. Therefore, since those actions are 
contradictory to what South Africa stands for post 1994, they undermine the contractive role 
that its human rights voting patterns in the Council could assist in bringing about relief in those 
countries having the duck cloud of human rights abuses and unintentionally reducing the 
chances of reaching its foreign policy objectives like securing a permanent position in the UNSC 
to represent the African continent. This is because on the Sudanese and Congolese 
Governments human rights issues, the South African Government voting patterns in the UNHRC 
are aligned with African solidarity that requires African problems to be resolved with African 
solutions as highlighted above.  
Thus, when these factors are combined together, they play an important role that justifies 
South Africa’s politicization, selectivity and double standards on the UNHRC resolutions, 
breaching its international human rights duties vested in the International Bill of Rights, 
Constitution and ubuntu diplomacy in the South African foreign policy document of 2011 and 
Mandela’s envisaged foreign policy approach centred on the international cooperation and 
human rights veneration. However, whether this inability to execute effectively its international 
obligations persisted in the period 2013 to 2015 will be a subject of debate in the following 
section in the UNHRC where again the South African Government voting patterns will be 
analysed in terms of its international pledges and commitments in the UN.  
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3.5. South African voting patterns in the UNHRC for the period 2013 to 2015 
Following its consecutive terms since the formation of the UNHRC in 2006, the South African 
Government has been in the Council until 2010. Although, one term has to lapse as per the 
Council rule following South Africa’s serving in the two consecutive terms, it was re-elected for 
the tenure 2013-2016. However, for the purpose of this section and paper in general, the focus 
will not be on the whole tenure of 2013-2016; rather the analysis will be on the period 2013 to 
2015 in the Council. The aim therefore, is to evaluate whether there has been a noticeable 
change on the voting patterns of South Africa in this tenure as compared to the previous 
one(2008-2010) on particular member states and in the light of its international duties attached 
with its accession of international human rights instruments.  
This is because in the previous one, the South African Government politicised the Council’s 
resolutions on certain human rights issues regarding particular member states in the UNHRC. 
For example, the inability of the South African Government to be professional on the Israel 
Government because of its association with the apartheid regime prior 1994 and its allegedly 
human rights abuses in the occupied territories. Furthermore, it has been selective on alleged 
human rights abusing countries that it has national interests either bilaterally or multilaterally 
as well as on those situated in the geographic region of Africa for solidarity purposes. 
Therefore, when analysing the voting patterns of South Africa in the UNHRC for period 2013 to 
2015, in the beginning subsection of this section attention the analysis will be on countries that 
first appeared in the previous section of 2008 to 2010 and in the subsequent subsection the 
analysis will be those on the new countries surfaced in the Council only in2013-2015. 
3.5.1. Countries overlapped from the term 2008-2010 to the period 2013-2015 in the UNHRC 
Many countries from the previous tenure of 2008-2010 have appeared in the Council even in 
the term 2013-2015. These include Israel, Sri Lanka and North Korea on which the voting 
patterns of the South African Government in the UNHRC did not changed.177 For instance, the 
Government of Israel in its occupied territories have been brought before the Council8 times in 
                                                          
177 See Vote Count ‘Voting record in 2014’, available at http://votescount.hrw.org/page/South%20Africa 
(accessed on 16 October 2015).  
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the period 2013-2015 because in 2014 Israel appeared 5 times and 3 times for the year 2015.178 
Therefore, the South African Government has consistently voted in favour of all the resolutions 
against the Israel Government actions in its occupied territories.179 The reasons as indicated in 
the previous section are the apartheid regime’s relationship with the Israel Government and 
non-discrimination that is embodied in the Conventions that are against all forms of 
discrimination such as among others the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) that the South African Government signed and ratified on 
03 October 1994 and 10 December 1998.180 
However, this is against the background that in its 2014 report in the UN as indicated in the 
previous tenure the Israel undertook measures to improve human rights, although the number 
of times within the space of 2013 to 2015 do not confirm with what it has said it is doing to 
meet its international obligations. Perhaps, Israel’s actions are aligned with its non-ratifications 
and reservations on major international human rights and related instruments such Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, Rome Statute of ICC and ICCPR.181 Despite that, these 
actions are not contributing to the human rights respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment 
because they are only based on its national interests of Israel as these form the central pillar of 
the realpolitik ideology of international relations rather than social constructivism and idealism 
to cater for the whole population of Israel irrespective of colour or race as Israel sought to claim 
despite WWII experience.182 
However, in the case studies of Sri Lanka and North Korea the South African Government voting 
record has been consistently abstaining for the whole period of 2014-2015 following its joining 
                                                          
178  See A/HRC/RES/28/26 ‘Israel settlements in the Occupied Palestine Territory, including East 
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan’ (10 April 2015); A/HRC/28/27 ‘Human Rights Situation in 
the Occupied Palestine Territory, including East Jerusalem’ (13 April 2015) and A/HRC/RES/29/25 
‘Ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, including East Jerusalem’ (22 July 2015).   
179 Ibid. 
180 DIRCO ‘International Agreements and/or Conferences Signed by South Africa in Relation to the Youth, 
Children and People with Disabilities, Particularly with Regard to the United Nations and the African 
Union’, available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005pq/pq2_455.htm (accessed on 16 October 2015).  
181 Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project ‘Israel: International treaties adherence’, available at 
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=113 (accessed on 17 
December 2015).  
182 Israel 2014 Human Rights Report, at 1. 
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of the Council in 2013.183 This is because in all three resolutions enacted by the UNHRC against 
Sri Lanka in 2014 the South African Government has been witnessed abstaining.184 This 
confirms the OHCHR that provided the dubious human rights situation of Sri Lanka hence the 
decision to propose a resolution to the UNHRC in order to investigate alleged serious violations 
and abuses of human rights as well as related crimes by government forces and rebellions.185 
And these actions of the establishment of facts and circumstances of such alleged violations 
and the crimes perpetuated were developed with the view to avoid impunity and ensure 
accountability, the assistance from relevant experts and special procedures mandate holders,186 
was placed forward in this regard. 
Therefore, as indicated in the 2008-2010 tenure South Africa’s voting patterns are driven by the 
national interests irrespective of human rights violations in Sri Lanka that include intolerance on 
the basis of race or ethnicity, nationality and class although the South African Government itself 
is still grappling with those challenges post 1994. For example, the Sri Lankan Government is 
still facing human rights challenges of discrimination or perpetual inequality along racial lines, 
xenophobia and related intolerance as well as the comprehensive implementation of and 
follow-up on Durban Declaration and Programme of Action as highlighted by the Sri Lankan 
Government statement in the UNHRC.187 
Likewise, the South African Government itself despite its voting patterns on human rights 
situation in Sri Lanka in the UNHRC does not reflect urgency to curb the same challenges that it 
still faces notwithstanding the fact that decades have passed in the democratic dispensation. 
This is because in South Africa there are still issues of race, class and xenophobia among others 
that are felt or experienced even today although hope were high before the 1994 political 
                                                          
183 Vote Count ‘Voting record in 2014’, available at http://votescount.hrw.org/page/South%20Africa 
(accessed on 16 October 2015). 
184 Ibid. 
185  See A/HRC/30/CRP.2 ‘Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL)’, (16 September  
2015) paras 1, 209-1112.    
186 Ibid paras 14-16. 
187 Statement by Sri Lanka 12thsession of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective 
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, 7 April 2014, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/IWG/session12/SriLanka.docx (accessed on 16 October 
2015).  
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referendum. According to some commentators these comes from the developmental 
challenges that the South African society still faces such as poverty, inequality and 
underdevelopment among others that lead to issues of intolerance like xenophobia among 
others in May 2008 and April this year as reflected in the previous chapter.188 
In addition to that, the issue of xenophobia in particular in the South African society is coming 
from the antagonistic immigration policy that is in contradiction to the Bill of Rights in chapter 
two of the South African Constitution. In particular, several rights of foreign nationals are being 
violated from all walks of life although it is the South African Government responsibility to 
protect those rights by the citizens or third parties and state itself as stipulated in section 7(2) 
of the Constitution. Despite that, the South African Government showed commitment to 
resolve issues related to xenophobia particularly with the affected foreign nationals of 
particular countries following the xenophobic outbreak in several major cities of South Africa in 
various provinces.189 
Moreover, in the case study of North Korea and similar to the case study of Sri Lanka, the South 
African Government has been identified consistently abstaining on all resolutions against Korea 
in the UNHRC regarding human rights. This voting style by the South African Government has 
been noted in the 2014 and 2015 resolutions by the UNHRC against that country after it was re-
elected to serve in the Council in the year 2013.190 In particular, the voting patterns of South 
African regarding the Korean Government human rights resolutions by the Council relate to 
recent developments in South Africa. These are threats to seize the media by the ruling party 
                                                          
188 See Reties, M. (2009). Xenophobic triggers situated in the history and legal provisions of domestic and 
international migration policies in South Africa. Synopsis, 10(3) 13; Strumpet T ‘Xenophobic Violence 
against migrants in South Africa: A discussion of the causes, its link to development in South Africa and 
potential solutions’ (2013) International Public Management-The Hague University of Applied Sciences 7-
11 and Wilkinson K South Africa's xenophobic attacks: are migrants really stealing jobs? (20 April 2015), 
The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/south-africa-xenophobic-
violence-migrants-workforce (accessed on 10 October 2015). 
189  City Press ‘State’s plan to fight xenophobic attacks’ (26 April 2015), News24, available at 
http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/States-plan-to-fight-xenophobic-attacks-20150430 
(accessed on 10 October 2015). 
190 See Vote Count ‘Voting record in 2014’, available at http://votescount.hrw.org/page/South%20Africa 
(accessed on 16 October 2015) and A/HRC/RES/28/22 ‘Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea’ (08 April 2015).  
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and its alliance partners as highlighted in the previous section, intolerance of the independent 
trade unions among others such as Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(AMCU) in the major sectors of the South African economy that led to the Marikana Massacre 
in 2012 as well as protection of elite interests with little regard to human rights of the poor and 
previously disadvantaged populations.191 
However, despite the fact that these issues are of domestic nature, they also have international 
human rights image of the South African context post 1994. As highlighted in the opening 
paragraph of chapter one, these human rights abuses occur despite the fact that human rights 
promotion and protection were perceived as the drive of all South African Government 
domestic and international relations.192 Therefore, the realities of domestic and international 
politics see the South African Government slightly changing its stance towards realpolitik193 
while defending human rights abusers at the same time. 
In this regard, if South Africa persists in its actions its interests directly or indirectly will be 
indicated below on the cases only specific to 2013-2015 period of membership of UNHRC 
where its voting patterns highlighted double-standards and selectivity on certain BRICs 
members’ interests. In particular, these are specific to the case studies of Ukraine and Syria 
where China and Russia as permanent members of the Security Council used their veto rights in 
defence of their interests in the mentioned countries. And also, in the same vein the South 
African Government has been noticed following-suit to its BRICs allies, but in this regard in the 
UNHRC through consistently abstaining on human rights resolutions that requires the Council 
intervention in those countries and in defence of its interests in the BRICs multilateral initiative 
as will be highlighted below.  
 
                                                          
191 Davies N ‘The savage truth behind the Marikana massacre’ (22 May 2015), Mail & Guardian, available 
at http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-21-the-savage-truth-behind-the-marikana-massacre (accessed on 14 
October 2015). 
192 Mandela supra note 2, at 87.  
193 Bohle-Muller supra note 1, at 5.  
 64 | P a g e  
 
3.5.2. South African Government voting patterns on countries specific to the 2013-2015 
period of the Council 
There are four case studies in the Council in which the South African Government voted in a 
specific way in the Council for the period 2013-2015. These are Iran, Syria, Belarus and Ukraine. 
Therefore, below they will be analysed one-by-one in order to determine how the South African 
Government voted in the UNHRC and the rationale behind that particular way of voting.  
3.5.2.1. Iran 
Despite the fact that UN Secretary-General was tasked to report on the human rights situation 
in Iran following the resolution of the GA,194 there is no noticeable progress on the ground. This 
is due to the fact that human rights issue such as death penalty, including in relation to political 
and juvenile offenders are still persist in Iran despite international community intervention.195 
According to Human Rights Watch these human rights abuses follow the presidential and local 
elections of June 2013 that saw executions particularly related to drug offences, detention of 
civil society activists, media seizure and several others increasing in Iran.196 As a result of that, 
the UNHRC adopted a resolution pending the latest report of the Secretary General to resolve 
the human rights situation in that Country.197 
Therefore, in response to the scourge of human rights violations in Iran, the UNHRC enacted 
resolutions that require country-specific intervention to resolve human rights issues in Iran on 
which the South African Government in the UNHRC abstained in the voting. For instance, on the 
single resolution passed in 2014 and the one on April 2015, the South African Government has 
been noted abstaining.198 It did so, in solidarity with countries on Groups such as African and 
Arabic member states such as Algeria, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, and Namibia 
                                                          
194 A/RES/68/184 ‘Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (04 February 2014). 
195 A/69/306 ‘Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Secretary-General’ 
(12 August 2014) paras 3, 5-51.  
196  World Report 2014: Iran, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/iran 
(accessed on 15 October 2015).  
197 A/69/306 ‘Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Secretary-General’ 
(12 August 2014) para 3.  
198 See A/HRC/RES/25/24 ‘Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (10 April 2014) and 
A/HRC/28/21 ‘Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (08 April 2015). 
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among others in the African Group as well as from the Arabic Group or OIC Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates among others in the Council.199 In addition to that, Brazil and India among others 
from the BRICs, IBSA and NAM multilateral institutions where the South African Government is 
a member or partner in the 2014 and 2015resolutions both voted yes, no and abstained in the 
Council.  
In this regard, it is difficult to simply argue that whenever the voting records are occurring in 
the UNHRC are informed by group or partnership or even membership solidarity. This is 
because the mentioned countries from different multilateral institutions highlighted signs of 
disunity in their voting patterns in the Council on the Iran case in the periods 2014 and 2015 on 
which the South African Government started voting in the Council. This happens although many 
commentators as indicated in the literature review section of chapter one favours group 
solidarity as the rationale behind every particular way of voting in the UNHRC. However, 
arguing in this manner cannot be separated from the fact that in one way or another group or 
‘bloc’200 solidarities do play an important part when member countries are voting in the Council 
as will be indicated in the following case studies of Belarus, Ukraine and Syria how the South 
African Government voted in the UNHRC.  
3.5.2.2. Belarus  
Despite the fact that Belarus signed and ratified major international human rights 
instruments,201 it is still among countries in Europe characterised by many human rights 
violations when compared with its regional counterparts.202 This is because such human rights 
violations as restriction of freedom of expression and association, restrictive legislations on 
NGOs undermining their ability to operate as well as arbitrary detention of activists and 
discrimination against LGBT are still issues in Belarus.203 However, in response to the human 
                                                          
199 Ibid. 
200 Hug and Luk´acs supra note 15, at 84. 
201 OHCHR ‘Ratification status for Belarus’, available 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=16&Lang=EN (accessed 
on 17 October 2015).   
202  Human Rights Watch ‘Belarus’, available at https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/belarus 
(accessed on 17 October 2015). 
203 Ibid. 
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rights situation in Belarus, the UNHRC on 12 June 2012 appointed a Special Rapportuer 
informed by resolution 20/13 of the Council to monitor human rights situation in that country, 
help to implement recommendation of the OHCHR of June 2012 as well as to help the 
government of Belarus to fulfil its human rights obligations among other things.204 
Therefore, as the member of the UNHRC in the period 2013 to 2015, the South African 
Government has been abstaining on both resolutions of 2014 and 2015 adopted to curb the 
human rights situation in Belarus.205 The 2014 resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 24 
to 7, with 15 abstentions whereby South Africa, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Namibia among others from the African Group and Arabia among others abstained. In the same 
vein, for the 2015 resolution that was adopted by recorded vote of 21 to 8, with 18 abstentions, 
the South African Government and other African countries as well as Arabic states abstained in 
the Council against Belarus. 
Provided that, the South African Government voting patterns in the Council can be traced on its 
bilateral ties that existed between South Africa and Belarus since early 1990s when the 
democratic South Africa was still being negotiated.206 Therefore, these relations between these 
two countries in 2014 led to the South African delegation of DIRCO and Belarus delegation led 
by Maite Nkoana-Mashabane and Vladimir Makei meeting in Pretoria to build a mutual 
beneficial partnership that will contribute to national and regional development priorities such 
as trade and economic relations, as well as cooperation in education, agriculture and rural 
development.207 
                                                          
204 OHCHR ‘Special Rapportuer on the human rights situation in Belarus’, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CountriesMandates/BY/Pages/SRBelarus.aspx (accessed on 18 
October 2015).  
205 See A/HRC/RES/26/25 ‘Situation of human rights in Belarus’ (16 July 2014) and A/HRC/RES/29/17 
‘Situation of human rights in Belarus’ (22 July 2015).  
206Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in the Republic of South Africa ‘Political Dialogue with the Republic 
of South Africa’ (04 March 1993), available at 
http://rsa.mfa.gov.by/en/bilateral_relations/political/belarus_rsa/ (accessed 18 October 2015). 
207South Africa ‘SA, Belarus build bilateral ties’ (12 September 2014), South African Government New 
Agency, available at http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-belarus-build-bilateral-ties (accessed on 
18 October 2015).    
 67 | P a g e  
 
In addition to that, South Africa’s voting patterns are indirect contradiction to its visible role at 
the Council regarding thematic issues of racism and discrimination.208 This is because as 
indicated above, it abstained on the Council resolutions against Belarus in the same way it has 
been consistently abstaining on the case studies of North Korea, Sri Lanka, and Iran. Therefore, 
as South Africa abstained on the mentioned case studies across the periods of 2008 to 2010 
and 2013 to 2015 it had not changed irrespective of its guiding international and domestic 
documents on human rights issues globally. In doing so, it shows signs of selectivity, double 
standard and politicization of UNHRC decisions despite the fact that its voting patterns are 
unprofessional because the Council is not the political body like GA and UNSC since the 
demolition of the Commission that was known for several problems undermining human rights 
protection. 
However, continuing in this manner of voting by the South African Government hinder the 
progressive work of the Council on human rights because South Africa instead of helping the 
UNHRC to fulfil its agenda, it is taking the Council backwards. Therefore, for that reason the 
attention goes to the analysis of the voting patterns of the South African Government on other 
case studies such as Syria and Ukraine before the Council. Specific to these case studies there is 
an important dimension of politics of the UNSC that are tied with the politics of bilateral and 
multilateral politics embodied in the BRICs or South-South relations as South Africa is an active 
member in the African continent in the Council. In this regard, although it is beyond the scope 
of this paper, the dimension of the Security Council or BRICs politics will seem to prevail even in 
the non-political body of the UN called UNHRC and informing the South African Government 
voting patterns on human rights solutions involving Syria and Ukraine as the result of previous 
dissatisfactions caused by the international force intervention in Libya under the pretext of the 
“responsibility to protect” principle informed by the UN Charter provisions regarding 
international peace and security.209 
 
                                                          
208 Vote Count ‘Voting record in 2014’, available at http://votescount.hrw.org/page/South%20Africa 
(accessed on 16 October 2015). 
209Nuruzzaman M ‘Human Security and the Arab Spring’ (2013) 37 Strategic Studies 61. 
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3.5.2.3. Syria  
There is a lot of controversy surrounding the Syrian human rights issue in the UNHRC and how 
the South African Government voted in the Council’s resolutions in this regard as will be 
indicated below. In particular, it relates to the outbreak of Arab Spring early in 2011 and 
dissatisfactions that arose after external intervention in Libya by the North Atlantic 
Organisation Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces to enforce regime change in that country while 
diverting from UNSC Resolution 1973.210 Therefore, in the African region South Africa was one 
of the countries that were not satisfied by the NATO actions as well as BRICs countries such as 
Russia and China in the UNSC despite the fact that their voting patterns in that resolution were 
divided because South Africa voted in favour while the others abstained.  
However, that dissatisfaction despite divergent voting patterns in the Security Council re-
emerged in the UNHRC making the BRICs allies voting in a manner that undermines the 
credibility of the Council on the Syrian case study of human rights. Thus, as the permanent 
members of the Security Council from the Eastern bloc of Soviet Union before 1989 consistently 
voted against the resolution of the Council against Syria, the South African Government 
consistently abstained in the period 2013 to 2015.211  In this regard, the South African 
Government voting patterns on the Syrian human rights issue in the Council can be linked with 
its dissatisfaction with the external intervention that undermines the sovereign integrity 
principle of member states and the double standards that are consistently shown by western 
countries in the Middle East and African countries internal conflicts.  
                                                          
210 See Payandeh M ‘The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya’ (2012) 52, 
Virginia Journal of International Law 357 and Ulfestein G and Christiansen HF ‘The Legality of the NATO 
Bombing in Libya’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 166.   
211See A/HRC/25/23 ‘The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in 
the Syrian Arab Republic’ (09 April 2014); A/HRC/RES/26/23 “‘The continuing grave deterioration in the 
human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (17 July 2014) and A/HRC/27/16 
‘The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab 
Republic’ (03 October 2014) as well as A/HRC/RES/28/20 ‘The continuing grave deterioration in the 
human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (08 April 2015); A/HRC/RES/28/24 
‘The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab 
Republic’ (13 April 2015); A/HRC/RES/29/16 ‘The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and 
humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (22 July 2015) and A/HRC/RES/30/10 ‘The continuing 
grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (01 
October 2015).    
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Therefore, the dissatisfaction of the South African Government with the NATO interventions in 
Libya caused it to be reluctant to allow international intervention in Syria through a diplomatic 
voting style in the Council. This is because the South African Government was pushing for an AU 
agenda to curb the Libyan Government conflict with rebelling groups.212 However, in the Syrian 
case study the South African voting patterns can be said to imply the regional organisation in 
the Middle East as it wished in the Libyan case study in 2011 should resolve the conflict in that 
country without external intervention with ulterior motives like in Libya. In doing so, 
negotiations as occurred in South Africa in the early 1990s to facilitate peaceful transition from 
apartheid to democracy as was envisaged in the Interim Constitution of 1993 could be regard as 
a reason that informs South Africa’s voting record in the Council on the one hand.213 Therefore, 
for South Africa doing so favours its national interests, yet in terms of its obligations it is illegal 
to do so because the South African Government in this regard is politicizing human rights issues 
at the expense of international human rights law and its Constitution that draws from 
International Bill of Rights.  
However, since there is no evidence of bilateral relations that exists between South Africa and 
Syria, it can be argued that its voting patterns in the Council are informed by the involvement of 
Russia and China in the UNSC which are South African Government allies in the BRICs now 
undermining the credibility of the Council through politicizing its resolutions aimed at resolving 
human rights issues in that country on the other hand. Thus, in this regard, the South African 
Government is breaching its obligations in the UNHRC because South Africa politicizes or 
indicates signs of double standard on the human rights situation in Syria instead of voting in a 
manner that would assist the Council to resolve the human rights issue in that country. 
Therefore, it is up to the international community to hold accountable all member countries 
that failed or are unable to honour their responsibilities either directly or indirectly as these 
actions are problematic on other instances.  
                                                          
212Liebenberg I ‘War in disguise: the responsibility to protect (R2P) as a new means to armed aggression’ 
Chapter 15, in Potgieter T and Liebenberg I Reflections on War: Preparedness and Consequences 
(2012) 276.  
213White Paper on South Africa’s foreign policy (13 May 2011) 10. 
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This is because in so doing credible institutions like the UNHRC tasked with monitoring 
universal promotion and protection of human rights can be saved given the fact that they are 
being undermined by member countries like South Africa forgetting the huge impact that 
universal veneration of human rights could have on the enhancement of international relations 
between world countries. Thus, when such actions occurs it is advisable of the institutions like 
Council or UN in general to make every particular way of voting by member states especially 
the one that is not contributing to the respect, protection and promotion of human rights 
internationally questioned or shamed and seek the assistance from domestic institutions within 
member states to assist where there is a necessity. In doing so, what member states pledged 
and committed to fulfil should be used as a yardstick for the benefit of the powerless especially 
in the wake of forced migration because of persistent conflict in Syria.  
3.5.2.4. Ukraine  
For South African Government, the Ukraine human rights issue in the UNHRC is complex similar 
to the Syrian case study above. This is because in the Ukraine conflict there is South African 
Government ally in the BRICs called Russia which in one way or another impacts on how South 
Africa voted in the Council for the period 2013 to 2015. Additionally, since BRICs countries are 
regarded as a culmination of the good-global-citizens that are situated in the middle of world 
powers between superpowers and small powers.214 At least if they can use their stance and 
ideological belief of not being interested to confront or challenge the superpowers like South 
Africa sought to do in the UNSC for unrelated human rights purpose should be deterred. 
However, despite their interest in the peacekeeping role where the South African Government 
is a robust player in the African continent post 1994 as per the mandate of Article 42 of the UN 
Charter of 1945 especially on international peace and security in the UNSC mandate, South 
Africa with that middle powers tag seems to be doing little in the UNHRC. Furthermore, this 
also extends to other regions of the world and the existence of Russia in the case studies of 
Syria and most importantly in this subsection in Ukraine. Thus, it is safe to say that the South 
African Government voting patterns in the Ukraine case study are informed by the bilateral and 
                                                          
214Gilboa E ‘The Public Diplomacy of Middle Powers’ (2009) Publicdiplomacy.org 26.  
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multilateral relations with Russia and China in the Council. And for that matters, its particular 
way of voting in the UNHRC is the true reflection of that and its hope to be backed by these two 
permanent members of the Eastern bloc in the UNSC to reach its goal of being a UNSC member 
with a veto right as reflected by its actions in the Council below.  
For instance, provided the mentioned complexities South Africa in the UNHRC abstained in 
period 2013 to 2015 on all resolutions aimed at resolving human rights situation in Ukraine.215 
Similar to the above assertion in the previous case study, the voting patterns of BRICs countries 
have been fractured along the lines of voting against and abstaining particularly Russia, China 
and South Africa similar to the case study of Syria as well as it was in the case study of Libya in 
the UNSC although beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, in the UNHRC resolution against 
Ukraine South Africa opted for abstention which at this particular juncture had been joined 
Brazil from the BRICs side as well as Algeria from the African Group in the Council.216 
However, the perseverance of the South African Government to abstain on all resolutions 
regarding Ukraine as also surfaced in the case study of Syria indicates the selectivity or 
politicization of the UNHRC’s resolutions aimed at resolving human rights in that country. This 
happens despite the fact that South Africa believes on the values of ubuntu or human rights 
that should guide all its relations in the global stage post 1994. In addition to that, the South 
African Government actions are in direct contrast with its duties attached with the signing and 
ratification of international human rights documents. Therefore, the South African Government 
is counterproductive in the UNHRC although South Africa participated in the form of the 
Commission to the Council in 2006.  
 
 
                                                          
215 See A/HRC/26/30 ‘Cooperation and assistance to Ukraine in the field of human rights’ (15 July 2014) 
which was adopted by recorded vote of 23 to 4, with 19 abstentions that included South Africa, Algeria, 
and Brazil among others from the BRICS, African Group and Arab Group. Also see A/HRC/RES/29/23 
Cooperation and assistance to Ukraine in the field of human rights (21 July 2015) on which the South 
African Government voting record did not changed as well as Russia and China from BRICS voting 
against the resolution in the Council.   
216Ibid. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, many factors have been identified that impacted on the voting patterns of the 
South African Government in the UNHRC for the period 2008 to 2010 and 2013 to 2015. In the 
first part of the chapter regional, economic and political groupings constituting the Council such 
as African Group, OIC, NAM and others. However, despite the brief mentioning of the 
methodology that is used in the UNHRC to determine the rationale behind voting patterns of 
countries including South Africa before going to its country-specific voting patterns in the given 
period; t has been identified as problematic in the analysis these yes, no and abstain options of 
voting in the Council can be problematic. They allow member states the space to breach their 
obligations in the international stage because there is no mechanism that is being used to make 
countries account for every specific way of voting that is not productive towards the 
enhancement of human rights promotion and protection.    
As a result, the voting patterns of the South African Government in the periods 2008 to 2010 as 
well as 2013 to 2015 were identified as fluctuating between yes, no and abstain varying from 
one country to the next because of differing reasons. For instance, understandably so the case 
study Israel’s relationship with the apartheid regime as well as its actions in its occupied 
territories have determined the voting patterns of the South African Government to be 
consistent to human rights regardless of Israel’s submission of reports in the Council that 
indicate its commitment and achievement to its human rights obligations. However, what also 
emerged exceptionally in the South African Government actions against Israel its threat to 
revoke the “dual-citizenship” issue to indicate its dissatisfaction with Israel’s actions in its 
occupied territories and the involvement of both South African and Israel citizens in the caring 
of the Israel human rights abuse agenda.217 
In contrast, such actions on the case studies of North Korea and Sri Lanka did not surfaced as 
tools by South Africa to deter or discourage the human rights abuses. Instead domestic as well 
as South African bilateral relations with the mentioned countries informed its voting patterns in 
                                                          
217Shoba S ‘ANC threat to ban dual citizenship’ (06 September 2015), Sunday Times, available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2015/09/06/ANC-threat-to-ban-dual-citizenship (accessed 
on 05 October 2015).   
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the UNHRC despite serious or the abundance of evidence that indicate these countries has 
abused human rights considering their obligations internationally. This is because evidence 
indicates they have signed and ratified international documents, but their actions on the 
ground contradicted those efforts because many violations have occurred. Therefore, despite 
that the South African Government abstained in the Council when their alleged cases were 
brought for international attention and actions by the international community.    
Nevertheless, on the case studies of Sudan and DRC, the South African Government voting 
patterns in the Council varied between against and in favour in contrast to that of in favour and 
abstain in those cases of Israel, Sri Lanka and North Korea due to various reasons. For example, 
as had been indicated above, South Africa in the case study of Sudan consistently voted no in 
the Council resolutions particularly the ones sponsored by European States requiring extension 
of the UN mandate in that country, but yes on those aimed at ceasing the mandate despite 
continual human rights violations by African States like Egypt in the African Group. Central to 
these, is the South African bilateral and multilateral relationship with Sudan and African unity 
as presented in the notion of African solutions to African problems.  
Likewise, in the DRC case the South African Government remained voting against the UNHRC 
resolutions for the period 2008 to 2010 in order to promote and protect African solidarity and 
protect its national interests that are situated in DRC despite paying little regard for human 
rights violations that are persisting in that country. However, this differed in the case studies 
where it has bilateral and allies also in the form of either bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
like BRICs where there is Russia and China that are involved been noticed voting completely 
different on all human rights resolutions requiring country-scrutiny in Iran, Belarus, Syria and 
Ukraine compared to the mix of voting on African states in the Council for 2013-2015 period. 
For example in the case studies of Iran and Belarus Government of South Africa in the Council 
consistently abstained because it has bilateral arrangements with these two countries as well 
and there are also domestic developments that are supporting that such as slight moving 
towards clamping down media freedom and other things. In contrast, in the Syrian and Ukraine 
case studies, South Africa has been abstaining on the basis that it has bilateral and multilateral 
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arrangements with China and Russia. While, at the same time its voting patterns had been 
informed in the Council by the dissatisfaction in the UNSC resolution that it voted in favour on 
the ‘no-fly zone’ in Libya in 2011 and fearing to threaten its relations with the Security Council 
permanent member states such as Russia and China because it also has ambitions of 
representing the African continent in the UNSC using these two close allies in order to create a 
multi-polar system.   
In this regard, all these voting patterns of the South African Government when they are 
collected together in the light of the regional, economic and political groupings that have 
constituted the Council indicate South Africa’s failure to consistently adhere to its international 
responsibilities as stipulated in the Constitution (Bill of Rights), foreign policy as well as 
international human rights instruments it has signed and ratified post 1994. Thus, South Africa’s 
voting patterns or record in the UNHRC undermine the existence or essence of the Council itself 
because although ideals of the Post WW II era were envisaged in favour of universal human 
rights veneration; the realpolitik agenda always seems to prevail. Therefore, these brings to 
question whether the foreign policy of South Africa as a guiding document is explicit enough 
about human rights or ‘humanity’ as expressed in the notion of ubuntu and what should be 
done in the light of international community and South African structures that are better 
positioned to hold South Africa accountable for failing to abide by its obligations of respecting, 
protecting, promoting and fulfilling human rights in the global stage particularly in the UNHRC.  
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Chapter 4 
4. Conclusion and recommendations 
This chapter aims to summarise the main arguments reached in all the preceding chapters in an 
effort to responds to the research questions and achieve the principal objectives of the study. 
Chapter one of this paper provided the background of the study that relates in particular with 
the background of human rights in international relations since the end of WW II and how that 
has been encompassed in the foreign policy of the democratic South Africa post 1994. 
Therefore, this paper has done so by reflecting on the values that govern the international 
relations of South Africa such as ubuntu, and the 1996 Constitution with particular reference to 
the Bill of Rights and its relationship with the International Bill of Rights to effect positively on 
the human rights internationally as envisaged domestically post 1994.  
However, it had been noted that the democratic Government of South African although signed 
and ratified the mentioned international human rights treaties, in practice its national interests 
emerged to supersede human rights as reflected by some of its actions in the international 
human rights bodies such as UNHRC and related bodies like UNSC although beyond the scope 
of this paper. This as backdrop, brought into question what is the voting record and pattern of 
South Africa in the UNHRC? Does South Africa’s voting record comply with its international and 
regional human rights obligations? And does the South African Government voting patterns 
comply with its foreign policy objectives or principles of democracy and human rights? 
Therefore, this study asserts that the South African Government voting record or patterns in 
the UNHRC were inconsistent in order to comply fully with the values of ubuntu, its Constitution 
and international human rights law as embodied in the ICCPR, ICESCR and ACHPR in the Council 
for the periods 2008 to 2010 and 2013 to 2015 have been discussed. 
In particular, as presented in chapter two of this paper, there are a number of notable 
occasions where the South African Government drifted away from its international human 
rights obligations and pledges as was envisaged by the Government in waiting of the ANC 
before 1994 and now by the democratic Government. For example, in the Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe case studies despite in the UNSC as well as in the Dalai Lama case of visa refusal to 
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enter South Africa more than once proved that the democratic South Africa failed to honour its 
duties that are related to human rights, democracy and as well as peace and security 
implications in the international stage. Hence those actions show that South Africa’s deviated 
from the ubuntu and Constitutional values of democracy and human rights as well as rule of law 
that were envisaged to be a guide of South Africa’s international relations post 1994. It is the 
responsibility of the South African Government to adhere to the international and human rights 
law. In this regard, these cases constitute South Africa’s failure to adhere to its international 
duties in the name of its national interests vested in the African solidarity and bilateral or 
multilateral interests at the expense of democracy and human rights. 
Specifically, the voting records of South Africa in the UNHRC for the periods 2008 to 2010 and 
2013 to 2015 have at times been inconsistent with its international human rights law 
obligations and the Constitution. This has been noted in several case studies such as Israel, 
North Korea, Sri Lanka, Iran, Belarus, Syria and Ukraine. For instance, in the Israel case study, it 
was indicated that due to the historical association of Israel with the previous apartheid regime 
and also because of its human rights actions in Palestine, the South African government 
consistently voted yes in the UNHRC resolutions aimed at country-specific scrutiny of Israel. 
However, on all other case studies that are not situated in the geographical region of Africa and 
where there is China or Russia involved South Africa’s voting has been to consistently abstain 
across the periods 2008 to 2010 and 2013 to 2015. 
Conversely, on case studies pertaining to resolutions against countries that are situated in the 
geographical region of Africa such as DRC and Sudan, the Government of South Africa voted 
against interventions proposed before the UNHRC in the period of 2008 to 2010. In doing so, 
South Africa’s voting patterns were informed by who or which countries (either European or 
African) have sponsored a particular resolution towards a certain country (such as DRC or 
Sudan) and what its aim is, because those resolutions aimed at extending the period of 
investigation and resolving human rights in Sudan for instance were voted against by South 
Africa. Despite that, those resolutions that aimed at ending a mission or investigation were 
 77 | P a g e  
 
voted in favour presumably because of the consideration of African solidarity and South Africa’s 
national interests in the mentioned African countries. 
In that process of inconsistency in its voting patterns, the South African Government is shying 
away from its international responsibilities regarding human rights because there is no clear-cut 
in the South African foreign policy because its national interests seem to supersede human 
rights. This is an approach that ignores the fact that national interests can be enhanced and 
strengthened where there is peace and security, democracy and human rights veneration in the 
world in general. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that pragmatism in the 
foreign policy document of South Africa post 1994 is costing if not taxing on the human rights of 
the innocent people such as women and children and requires an unfathomable or high 
international community intervention especially in the human rights sector.  
Moreover, there is nothing inherently wrong to pursue national interests and being obsessed 
on the UNHRC about human rights abuses in specific countries, but it is unacceptable or illegal, 
when along the way of achieving self-interests human rights are being violated and the world 
institution to focus is mainly on one country than on others. However, despite the Israeli 
Government justification of its actions in the Occupied Territories on the basis self-interests 
that justifies its reservations and declarations as mentioned elsewhere in the paper, it is the 
responsibility of the international community to assess to what extent that has been abused at 
the expense of human rights. Hence now when considering the Council and South Africa’s 
obsession with Israel the blame can be shifted on both sides that is the formation of the UNHRC 
as indicated in the second section of chapter three and South African exploiting that to its own 
advantage. 
Likewise, abstaining on other case studies because of bilateral or multilateral arrangements and 
domestic developments indicate double standards on the South African Government stance in 
the UNHRC and could constitute a violation of its international human rights law obligations. 
For instance, in the North Korean human rights there is no proven record of bilateral or indirect 
multilateral relations between these two countries, except for the fact that, there are reported 
domestic developments that are aimed at seizing the print media and limit constitutional right 
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of the freedom of association because of ANC’s government dissatisfactions because of alleged 
media negative publicity218 and squeezing the space for the option towards dictatorship rather 
letting the democracy thrive. This also applies to the countries situated in the African continent 
in the name of African solidarity.  
Therefore, since the South African Government voting patterns in the UNHRC reflected the 
fracture of yes, no and abstain because of selectivity, politicisation and double standards at the 
expense of international human rights law and South African Constitution, this paper 
recommends that:  
 The South African Government should consider reviewing its foreign policy to be more 
human rights friendly in order to contribute further to the issues of peace and security 
as well as human rights and democracy in order to maximise its international relations 
objectives.  
 The international community working together with the South African Constitutional 
Court could assist in holding the South African Government accountable not only on 
domestic human rights challenges but also international human rights issues where the 
Government has deviated from the Bill of Rights and International Bill of Rights.   
 To the South African Government leaders, Pan-Africanism does not necessarily mean 
only Heads of States should be protected from imperialism as it is used to fight that, but 
it means human rights and other related matters of peace and security of the African 
people particular the vulnerable should take precedence at all costs.  
Notwithstanding that, the consistency in the voting patterns of South Africa on the Council 
resolutions could assist the Government of South Africa in many ways. For instance, it can help 
the Government in its efforts to earn a permanent membership in the UNSC and lead the 
African continent. In this regard, the South African Government has to take into cognizance that 
whatever happens in the UNHRC sphere in Geneva actually has implications in what happens in 
                                                          
218Letsoalo M ‘Blade to print Media: Be a nice profession’ (07 July 2015) Mail and Guardian online, 
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-07-blade-to-print-media-be-a-nice-profession (accessed on 07 
July 2015). 
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the UNSC in New York because of its capacity to either limit or increase South Africa’s chances 
in the international stage. 
Furthermore, it could enhance the South African Government international image in 
multilateral institutions like BRICs because of bringing a complete different perspective in that 
sector in the light of some human rights unfriendly partners in the bloc. Therefore, in doing so, 
the Government must also allow civil society organisations a space to advocate for human 
rights issues as well as hold the South African Government accountable when the state failed to 
abide by its responsibilities. This is because that would help the South African Government to 
avoid being seen as a country that is backtracking from its founding values of promoting 
democracy and human rights protection in the international stage as was envisaged by the likes 
of Mandela.  
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